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Abstract
Equity of access is a key policy objective in publicly-funded healthcare systems. However,
observed inequalities of access by socioeconomic status may result from differences in
patients choices. Using data on non-emergency coronary revascularisation procedures in the
English National Health Service, we found substantive differences in waiting times within
public hospitals between patients with different socioeconomic status: up to 35% difference,
or 43 days, between the most and least deprived population quintile groups. Using selection
models with differential distances as identification variables, we estimated that only up to
12% of these waiting time inequalities can be attributed to patients choices of hospital and
type of treatment (heart bypass versus stent). Residual inequality, after allowing for choice,
was economically significant: patients in the least deprived quintile group benefited from
shorter waiting times and the associated health benefits were worth up to £850 per person.
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21 Introduction
In the presence of public insurance and limited co-payments, waiting times and waiting lists
are used as a non-price rationing mechanism in several OECD countries (Martin and Smith,
1999; Siciliani et al., 2013). The main justification for rationing public healthcare by waiting
time, rather that price, is that this breaks the link between access and ability to pay (Manning
et al., 1987). Patients in equal need are supposed to wait their turn on a first-come, first-
served basis, irrespective of ability to pay  or, indeed, race, family background or other
social characteristics that may influence ability to pay. The price of accessing services to the
patient, such as reduced health-related quality of life while waiting for treatment, is shared
equally across patients of equal need. Waiting lists are therefore perceived as a way of
ensuring equal access to public healthcare.
If richer patients wait less for public services than poorer patients then waiting times are not
as equitable as they appear. A small but growing literature suggests that this may indeed be
the case in relation to waiting times for a number of routine, low-risk hospital procedures (see
Cooper et al., 2009, and Laudicella et al., 2012, for England; Monstad et al., 2014, and
Kaarboe and Carlsen, 2014, for Norway; Johar et al., 2013, and Sharma et al., 2013, for
Australia; and Siciliani, 2016, for a detailed overview). However, it is not known whether
these waiting time inequalities are due to rich patients opting for providers with shorter
waiting times or receiving treatments with shorter waiting times. Policies aimed at enhancing
patient choice are increasingly popular in publicly-funded Western healthcare systems,
including England (Thomson and Dixon, 2006). A better understanding of the effect of
patient choices on waiting time inequalities is required to allow for a more complete
assessment of the effect of these policies.
In this study, we estimate the contribution of patients choice behaviour to waiting time
inequality for two treatments for a severe and costly disease that has not previously been
examined in the waiting time literature. Coronary heart disease was the largest single cause of
years of life lost in the UK in 2010 (Murray et al., 2010) and consumed £1,9bn (just over 2%)
of total public healthcare expenditure in England in 2011/12 (NHS England, 2013). We focus
on two coronary revascularisation procedures, coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG)
surgery and angioplasty (percutaneous coronary intervention, PCI), where patients have
substantially reduced quality of life and may experience a non-negligible risk of dying while
waiting. Due to the existence of a universal publicly-funded health system  the National
3Health Service (NHS)  most coronary revascularisation procedures of this kind in England
are carried out in public hospitals and we are therefore able to exploit data on all publicly-
funded procedures. Our prior was that wait inequalities for coronary revascularisation are
negligible since we expect the management of the list to be rigorous for a potentially life-
threatening condition, and the health system more reluctant to let socioeconomically
advantaged patients move ahead in the queue.
Perhaps surprisingly, we find instead economically large and statistically significant
differences in waiting times across socioeconomic groups. Patients living in more income-
deprived (poorer) areas wait longer than patients in less deprived areas that attend the same
hospital. In 2002 coronary bypass patients in the least deprived quintile group waited 35%
less (43 days) compared to the most deprived ones  considerably larger than the 8%
differential (17 days) observed for hip replacement in 2001/02 (see Laudicella et al., 2012).
The gradient in waiting times gradually falls to 9.5% in 2010, following the general
reductions in waiting times at system level achieved by the English NHS in a sustained and
costly war on waiting in the 2000s through additional funding and an aggressive target
regime (Department of Health, 2000). Similar patterns are observed for angioplasty.
One key economic factor explaining differences in waiting times by socioeconomic status
(SES) is patient heterogeneity with respect to choice of hospital and treatment. Patients with
different SES may differ in the way they exercise choice (either directly or mediated through
their GP), with richer and more educated individuals being more likely to travel further,
either because they have a stronger preference for shorter waiting times (and a higher quality)
or because they have fewer financial or other constraints that limit their ability to travel. They
may also differ in risk and time preferences over different revascularisation procedures.
Hence, SES may have both a direct effect on waiting time (e.g. through discrimination) and
an indirect effect (operating through patients choices). Failure to account for patients
choices may lead to self-selection bias in estimates of the direct socioeconomic waiting time
gradient.
Analytically, we allow for self-selection due to patient choice through a switching regression
(Roy) model which includes selection correction adjustments in each outcome equation
(Heckman, 2010). Patients have as many potential outcomes (i.e. different waiting times) as
there are alternative choices (i.e. whether they bypass their local hospital or not; whether they
are treated with a coronary bypass or angioplasty). The realised outcome is associated with
4the choice that provides the highest latent utility. We use exclusion criteria based on the
differential distance between the closest and second closest provider, which is a strong
predictor of the probability of bypassing the local hospital (and in line with the seminal work
by McClellan et al., 1994, and literature that followed). This approach is novel and has not
been used in the previous literature on waiting time inequalities. It allows us to identify how
much of the socioeconomic gradient is explained by choice or self-selection. Conversely, the
remainder of the gradient is more likely to represent waiting times inequalities that originate
from the doctor-patient relationship within the hospital and are, thus, more amenable to
regulatory intervention. Examples include hospital specialists being more susceptible to
pressure from individuals with higher SES, either directly or via their social networks, or
wealthier and more educated patients being more effective in expressing their needs.
Alternatively, inequalities may be due to unconscious bias and statistical discrimination by
doctors (Van Ryn and Burke, 2000, Balsa and McGuire, 2001).
Our key finding is that patients with higher SES are more likely to exercise choice (directly
or through the interaction with their GP) by bypassing the local hospital, but that patients
choices account for only up to 12% of waiting time inequalities. The remaining SES gradient
is statistically and economically significant. By adjusting for choice, we recognise that we are
adjusting for a combination of the preferences and constraints that drive choice. To estimate
unfair inequality, it might be argued that the aim should be to adjust purely for differences in
preferences, rather than also for differences in constraints that cause unequal opportunity to
access timely services (Roemer, 1998; Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009). If so, and insofar as
the higher probability of deprived patients of going to the local hospital (i.e. not bypassing
the closest hospital) is driven partly by constraints rather than preferences, then our estimate
of the degree of unfair inequality can be seen as a conservative lower bound.
The study is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional background. Section
3 presents the econometric methods. Sections 4 and 5 describe respectively data and results.
Section 6 provides some robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional Setting
During the period 2002 to 2010 the English NHS experienced a phase of accelerated
expenditure growth. This was the result of a perception that the NHS was under-funded and
that quality was suffering as a result (Moran, 1999). A large investment plan was designed
5and implemented, leading to a 50% increase in the allocated budget and an approximately
33% increase in treatment capacity over a five-year period starting in 2003. This included
funding for additional beds in existing hospitals, building of new hospitals and care centres,
as well as employment of additional doctors, nurses and supporting staff.
Expenditure growth was accompanied by a number of major healthcare reforms. One of the
most effective reforms was the implementation of centrally imposed waiting time targets with
associated penalties for failure (Department of Health, 2001, 2002b, Commission for Health
Improvement, 2003). This policy regime was explicitly aimed at reducing excessive waiting
times for planned procedures. The maximum waiting time from addition to the waiting list to
admission was gradually reduced from 18 months to 12 months in 2003, 9 months in 2004
and 6 months in 2005. This target was reformulated in 2010 and patients are now expected to
wait no longer than 18 weeks from primary care referral to treatment (NHS England, 2013).
The waiting time policy is a core part of a performance management strategy that required
hospitals to meet targets to avoid regulatory interventions, either in the form of a senior-
management change or take-over by a better performing hospital. These strong incentives
contributed to the decline of waiting times for planned surgeries without measurable
detriment to quality (Propper et al., 2010).
During the same period, a policy allowing patients to choose the hospital for planned
treatment was introduced in the English NHS, with the aim of providing a competitive
incentive for hospitals to improve quality and responsiveness to citizens needs. This policy
was part of a broader attempt to modernize the public sector by enhancing consumers
choice, both in UK and other countries (Besley and Ghatak, 2003, Pawson et al., 2006,
Musset, 2012, Vrangbaek et al., 2012). The choice policy was rolled out in phases between
2006 and 2008.
For life-threatening conditions, including those requiring revascularisation procedures such as
CABG surgery and angioplasty, pilot reforms offering a limited guarantee of patient choice
were introduced from July 2002 (Department of Health, 2002a). From that date, patients who
had been waiting for more than six months were given the option to choose from a range of
alternative providers. The full choice reforms were then introduced from 2006, offering
choice from the point of GP referral. In practice, however, patients have always been able to
exercise a degree of choice via their GP, with well-informed patients more likely to influence
6their GP. The choice policy shifted the focus from the GP to the patient in making this
choice.
3 Methods
3.1 Baseline model without accounting for patients choices
We wish to quantify the extent of socioeconomic inequality in waiting time for NHS-funded
elective surgery within English NHS hospitals, and its evolution over time. Our data are
repeated cross-sections of individuals receiving a given revascularisation procedure, i.e.
either CABG surgery or PCI. Our first econometric strategy uses a linear model with hospital
fixed effects, estimated separately for each financial year and revascularisation procedure.
The regression model is specified as:
1 2 3ij j ij ij ij ijw h y s xE E E Hc c c     (1)
where  lnij ijw W and is the waiting time of patient i in hospital j. is a vector of
dummy variables capturing SES as measured by income deprivation of the area where the
patients resides. We split the income deprivation distribution into five quintiles, with the
highest indicating the least deprived areas (our reference category). is the vector of
coefficients of interest. Income-related inequalities favouring the rich arise if the elements of
are positive.
The vector contains severity controls: age, gender, number of secondary diagnoses,
number of hospital emergency admissions in the year preceding the procedure, and dummies
for Charlson co-morbidities (Charlson et al., 1987). These proxies control for patients latent
health status, which is unknown to the econometrician but known to the doctor and/or the
patient herself. Controlling for severity and comorbidity is important because these are
legitimate reasons for higher priority on the waiting list which are also (negatively) correlated
with income (Marmot et al., 1991, Smith, 1999, Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2000). The
vector includes non-severity variables such as month of admission.
j
h is a vector of hospital fixed effects. It controls for differences in waiting times across
hospitals which may arise from unobserved demand and supply factors, such as the number
ijW ijy
1E
1E
ijs
ijx
7of beds, nurses, doctors, infrastructure, management and organization, and clinical quality.
Hence should be interpreted as waiting time inequalities arising within a hospital, as
opposed to across hospitals.
Throughout the study we only present results which include hospital fixed effects and
therefore focus on socioeconomic inequalities arising within the hospital rather than across
hospitals. This is because in England the waiting time gradient hardly changes when we
control for hospital fixed effects and when we do not (results available on request). This
suggests that poorer individuals are not systematically located nearby hospitals with longer
waiting times, and that waiting time inequalities arise within as opposed to across hospitals.
This is not necessarily the case for other countries. Johar et al. (2013) show that in Australia
about half of the waiting time inequalities are across hospitals and about half are within
hospitals suggesting that poor patients have access to hospitals with long waits.
is the idiosyncratic error. We estimate Equation (1) through OLS with Huber-White
standard errors robust to unknown heteroscedasticity. We use the logarithm of waiting time
as the dependent variable to reduce the skewness of its distribution. We calculate estimates of
the waiting time inequalities on the natural scale by employing a Duan smearing adjustment
(Duan, 1983).
1
3.2 Endogenous switching regressions with selection correction
Despite the hospital fixed effects and the extensive controls on severity, OLS estimation of
Eq.(1) the estimates of the income gradient does not account for the presence of selection
(Heckman, 1979). We consider two types of selection: choice of hospital and type of
treatment.
We may expect more deprived patients to be less willing to travel or experience more
difficulties in travelling compared to less deprived patients, and therefore to be more likely to
1
The estimated waiting times by income deprivation quintile are computed as ,
where is the Duan smearing estimator and is the income deprivation
quintile (1 = most deprived).
1E
ijH
1E
 1,ÖÖ[ | ] exp gE W y g \ E  u
 Ö Ö1 exp( )ij
i
N\ H ¦ 1,...,5g  
8seek care in the closest hospital. Hence, some of the observable differences in waiting time
across SES groups (within the same hospital) may be the result of heterogeneity in
preferences or constraints to the ability to travel. The waiting-time differential may increase
non-linearly if more deprived patients are also unobservably sicker than less deprived ones.
Revascularisation procedures also have different risk/benefit profiles: CABG surgery carries
a higher risk of short-term mortality but also exhibits better long-term survival rates and post-
operative quality of life than PCI for patients older than 65 or those with certain co-
morbidities such as diabetes (The BARI investigators, 1996, 2007, Hlatky et al., 2009,
Taggart, 2009). We have proxies of patient health status and severity as control variables but
cannot observe the exact patient pathology. Furthermore, even for a given pathology, PCI and
CABG may still be substitutes for some patient profiles (Griffin et al., 2007, Dalton et al.,
2016), and patients risk and time preferences may thus determine the choice of treatment.
The two procedures have different in-hospital lengths of stay (two days for PCI; nine days for
CABG), which implies different opportunity costs. Whether less deprived patients have
higher or lower opportunity costs is a priori ambiguous. On one hand, less deprived patients
forgo higher wages. On the other hand, they may have lower time preference discount rates
(e.g. because they are not in precarious employment and thus less likely to lose their job due
to absence), and so be more likely to undergo a CABG procedure, if they perceive it as a
procedure delivering greater long-run health benefits and longevity despite imposing greater
short-term risk, inconvenience and loss of time.
We estimate Roy model regressions (Roy, 1951, Heckman and Honoré, 1990, Heckman,
2010), also known as switching regression models, with a correction term to control for self-
selection that is due to patients choosing i) a hospital which is different from the local one,
and ii) a revascularisation procedure (coronary bypass versus PCI).
2
We model and estimate
the two choices separately, as we are interested in the separate effect of each self-selection
mechanism on the waiting time gradient.
3
2
For another application of switching regression methods, see for example Perotin et al. (2013), which
investigates differences in patients satisfaction between public and private providers.
3
We provide estimates of a joint (2x2) self-selection model for procedures and hospital location in Appendix C.
The key insights would be similar but the presentation of the results more involved.
9We model the choice of the hospital with a selection equation for bypassing the closest
hospital.
4
Define ijn as a dummy equal to 1 if the patient bypasses the closest hospital and 0
otherwise. The Roy model is then defined as
(2)
where 1ijw and 0ijw represent the observed log waiting times for patients selecting respectively
into the non-closest or closest hospital, and
*
ijnw is the latent waiting time outcome for every
patient before self-selecting into a given hospital.
The estimating equations of this model are
  ^ `0 1 2 3 0 , 0,1ij ij ij ij ij ij ijn I z y s x nJ J J J Qc c c c     !  (3)
l^ ` l 1 1 1 1 1,1 1 2,1 1 3,1 1 1 1| , , , ,ij j ij ij ij j ij ij ij ijz zE w h y s x p h y s x pE E E U Oc c c     (4)
l^ ` l 0 0 0 0 1,0 0 2,0 0 3,1 0 0 0| , , , ,ij j ij ij ij j ij ij ij ijz zE w h y s x p h y s x pE E E U Oc c c     (5)
The unobserved error terms follow a degenerate trivariate Gaussian distribution, i.e.
 ZLWK PHDQ ]HUR DQG FRYDULDQFH PDWUL[ ȍn, where
. The covariance between and is not defined, as and are
both potential outcomes of which only one can be observed at any time.
Patients are assumed to self-select into the hospital that provides the highest latent utility (Eq.
(3)). Their choice is potentially driven by all factors affecting waiting times, i.e. severity, co-
4
We do not model the choice among all hospitals, but focus only on whether the patient bypassed the local
provider. This reduces computational burden and is realistic given the high market concentration of
revascularisation procedures. Moreover, it allows us to formulate our empirical models in a purely
counterfactual framework in which the patient is faced with only two alternatives. We expect that this
simplification has no substantial effect on our results.
  ^ `0 1 2 3
*
1 1,1 1 2,1 1 3,1 1 1
*
0 1,0 0 2,0 0 3,0 0 0
0 , 0,1 ,
, if 1,
, if 0
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
ijn ij j ij ij ij ij ij
ijn ij j ij ij ij ij ij
n I z y s x n
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E E E H
E E E H
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morbidities, age, other patient characteristics and income deprivation. We observe Eq.(4)
when patients bypass the closest hospital and Eq.(5) when not. No hospital fixed effect is
included in the selection equation. Hospital fixed effects would be endogenous in a selection
equation for the choice of bypassing the closest hospital because the share of patients
choosing a given hospital (i.e hospital fixed effect) is a function of whether the hospital is
close by (dependent variable). Similarly, we do not include average hospital quality or
waiting times in the choice equation, as they would behave as a hospital fixed effect. As such,
the unobserved variation in the choice outcome due to hospital characteristics (quality,
waiting times) is included in the residuals ijQ . This variation is then controlled for in the
waiting time outcome equations (4) and (5) by the selection correction terms and
.
5
The model can be identified through nonlinearities (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), but it is
good practice to include at least one exclusion restriction variable (instrument) in the
selection equation to avoid collinearity problems in the outcome equation (Newey, 1999).
Our instrument ijz measures the difference in the distances between the closest and the
second closest hospital for a given procedure from the patients area of residence (which we
refer to as first and second available hospital). It is therefore based on distances from the
patients residence to the location of the (two) closest hospitals. Such computation is based
on the geographical coordinates corresponding to the hospital postcodes, and the
geographical coordinates of the small area level (LSOA) where the patient resides. The
ordering of hospitals is based on the distance to the patients residence. Patients are expected
to choose the closest hospital, all else equal. The instrument is therefore not based on the
distance to the hospital chosen by the patient.
6
The differential distance between the closest and second closest provider is a measure of the
relative opportunity cost of attending different hospitals. The use of differential distance as a
5
Model (2) therefore accounts both for the within hospitals variation in waiting times and for the correlation
between waiting times and self-selection patterns due to the differences in average hospitals characteristics
(average waits, quality).
6
We have also considered alternative exclusion restrictions based on other geographical variables, e.g. the
number of hospitals within a fixed radius from the patients residence, or the rurality of patients residence.
However these other variables are likely to affect directly the outcome of interest (waiting times), thus not
constituting valid exclusion restrictions. Moreover, Newey (1999) shows that one valid exclusion restriction is
sufficient for the consistent estimation of sample selection models with non-Gaussian error terms.
1
Ö( )pO
0
Ö( )pO
11
source of exogenous variation (and therefore suitable instrumental variable or exclusion
restriction variable) has been introduced in the health economics literature by the seminal
work of McClellan et al. (1994; see also Newhouse and McClellan, 1998). Subsequently, it
has been applied in different contexts, e.g. on the effect of hospital ownership on quality
(Sloan et al., 2001; Shen, 2002; Lien, 2008).
7
Patients are assumed not to have chosen where
to reside on the basis of expected waiting time for a treatment for which they face uncertain
demand in the future.
8
We estimate the model in two steps (Brave and Walstrum, 2014). We first retrieve the
propensity score p (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) from the estimation of a probit model for
the selection equation. The selection correction terms for the two outcome equations are then
computed as     > @11 Ö Ö Ö1z z zp p pO I ª º ) ¬ ¼ and     > @10 Ö Ö Öz z zp p pO I ª º  )¬ ¼ . In the
second step, two separate equations for the waiting time outcomes are estimated, one for each
regime of hospital choice (closest versus not closest). Selection correction for the two
conditional means is addressed by the terms  1 ÖpO and  0 ÖpO . Non-zero coefficients on
these terms indicate self-selection. Estimation is performed by OLS on the original covariates
plus the selection correction term. Standard errors are bootstrapped to account for the two-
step estimation process (Murphy and Topel, 2002).
Including hospital fixed-effects jh in the waiting times equations of the Roy model is crucial
to identify the within-hospital waiting-times gradient due to SES. We include hospital effects
that are equal in the two switching regimes because they represent unobservable supply or
quality shifters that are valid for the same hospital, independently on the choice of the patient.
7
The results from the probit regression in the Roy model (presented below in Tables 5 and 6) show that
differential distance between the second and the first closest hospitals is a strong predictor of the propensity of
the patient to bypass or not the closest hospital, for both CABG and PCI treatments.
8
While the differential distance between the two closest hospitals is a good predictor of the choice of bypassing
the first closest hospital, such difference is unlikely to have a direct effect on the individual waiting time
outcome. To our knowledge, there is no evidence of residential sorting for hospital care in England. It is
possible that patients in need of repeated treatments, like haemodialysis or chemotherapy, are more likely to
locate closer to hospitals to minimize travel. But patients are less likely to change their residence for one-off
treatments like CABG or PCI. Moreover, even if patients did marginally sort their residence according to
distance and/or average waiting times of the first closest hospital, they would be less likely to choose their
residence according to distances and average waiting times of both the first and the second closest hospitals. As
such, it is plausible that the differential distances between second and first closest hospitals constitutes a valid
exclusion restriction variable with respect to waiting times, especially as the exogeneity has to hold just
conditional on the covariates included in the selection equation (i.e. weak exogeneity).
12
Hence we constrain the hospital level effects to be the same as those estimated by OLS in
Eq.(1).
We estimate a similar Roy model for the choice between CABG surgery and PCI, with
analogous specifications and distributional assumptions of the error terms. As exclusion
restriction, we compute for each individual patient the difference between i) the average
distance from patient address to the three closest hospitals offering CABG and ii) the average
distance from patient address to the three closest hospitals offering PCI.
9
Ceteris paribus, the
patient is assumed to select the procedure with the highest availability in her location. If
hospitals providing CABG surgery are further away from the patient than PCI providers, the
patient is more likely to choose PCI to reduce her travel costs.
10
In this case, we allow for
different hospital fixed-effects in the waiting time equations, 1jh and 0jh , as the unobserved
supply factors that we want to control for might have different impact on the two
revascularization procedures.
3.3 Estimates of patients welfare loss due to waiting
Waiting causes disutility to the patient, mostly because health benefits are postponed and
suffering is prolonged. We estimate the monetary value of the health forgone due to waiting
for revascularisation treatment to quantify the re-distributing effect of socioeconomic
inequality in waiting time. The estimated cost of waiting, gM , for deprivation group
1,..., 5g Q Q (with 1Q the most and 5Q the least deprived groups), is computed as
> @  Ö Ö|g gM E M y g U W WTP U   ' u u (6)
where ÖgW are the estimates of the waiting times by deprivation quintiles, and U' is the
change in the patients utility (due to health gains) following revascularisation.  WTP U is
the willingness to pay for one year of life in full health (standardised to one utility unit),
9
Formally, define ҧ݀ଷ,஼஺஻ீ ( ҧ݀ଷ,௉஼ூ) respectively as the average distance from each patients address and the
address of the three closest hospitals providing elective CABG (PCI). The exclusion restriction variable for each
patient is  ?݀ ҧଷ = ҧ݀ଷ,஼஺஻ீ െ ҧ݀ଷ,௉஼ூ.
10
The set of English hospitals providing elective CABG surgery is substantially smaller compared to PCIs.
While in 2002 the number of hospitals was similar (32 for CABG and 37 for PCI), by 2010 the number of
hospitals offering PCIs had more than doubled (32 for CABG and 83 for PCI). For only about 30% of the
patients in our sample the nearest three hospitals offer both PCI and CABG surgery, so there is substantial
variation in our exclusion restriction variable.
13
currently assumed to be £60,000 by the English Department of Health (2013).
11,12
We utilise
a common WTP estimate for all socioeconomic groups to ensure comparability.
4 Data
We use data from Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) for the nine financial years (April to
March) 2002/03 to 2010/11. HES is an administrative dataset containing records of all NHS-
funded hospital admissions in England.
13
The sample includes all elective patients admitted
for CABG surgery or PCI.
14
We exclude duplicates, incomplete admission records, or records
with missing information on important covariates. Elective inpatient waiting time measures
the total time between the patient being added to the waiting list and being admitted to
hospital for treatment. We extract information on patients age, gender, month of admission,
and severity controls (see section 3.1).
We approximate socioeconomic status through the income domain of the Economic
Deprivation Index (EDI) (Gill, 2012). The EDI measures the proportion of people aged 18 to
59 in each of the 32,482 small areas in England (Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs), with
about 1,500 residents) who are living in low-income households (more specifically, benefit
units) that are claiming out-of-work means-tested social security benefits (either Income
Support (IS) or income-based Jobseekers Allowance (JSA-IB)). The data are provided per
quarter and aggregated at annual level. EDI is comparable over the study period since it
accounts for changes to the tax and benefit systems over time. LSOAs are ranked according
to the level of economic deprivation in each year. We generate a set of dummy variables,
11
A similar figure is provided by Ryen and Svensson (2014).
12
is computed as the discounted utility of the patients health status six years after revascularization
treatment minus the discounted utility associated with receiving medical management treatment (i.e. no
intervention). The discounted utilities from CABG and PCI are respectively 0.69 and 0.65, while the utility from
medical management is 0.54, according to estimates from Griffin et al. (2007).
13
We do not have information regarding privately insured or self-funded patients who are treated by private
sector hospitals. The private sector accounted for only 2.1% (6.8%) of planned CABG (PCI) interventions
during the years 2008/2011 in England (Ludman, 2012, NICOR, 2012). If we assume that private treatments is
sought mainly by the wealthiest patients, living in the least income deprived areas, our estimates of the income-
deprivation gradient on waiting times will be downward biased.
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We define elective patients as all non-emergency patients classified in HES as booked, waiting list or planned
patients. We identify as CABG patients those having a K40-K46 OPCS-4 procedure code, excluding patients
treated contemporaneously with a PCI or a heart valve procedure (codes K25-K38). We identify as PCI patients
those not treated with a CABG procedure, and having a K49-K50 or a K75 or K508 and K718 OPCS-4 within
their treatments. For reference, see also:
https://indicators.ic.nhs.uk/download/NCHOD/Specification/Spec_09F_211ISR1CPP2_12_V1.pdf
(updated February 2014).
U'
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corresponding to the five quintile groups of the income deprivation distribution at LSOA
level in each year of the sample.
Straight-line distances are computed between the centroid of patients LSOA of residence
(available in HES) and the postcode of the relevant hospitals in a given year through their
geographic coordinates. For each patient and procedure, we compute the differential distance
between the closest hospital and the second closest hospital (which we use in the selection
equation of bypassing the closest hospital). For each patient, we also compute the difference
between i) the average distance from patient address to the three closest hospitals offering
CABG and ii) the average distance from patient address to the three closest hospitals offering
PCI (see footnote 10 for a formal definition). The hospital choice sets for patients are
computed separately by procedure and then merged.
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive statistics
More than 320,000 publicly-funded, elective revascularisation procedures have been
performed in the English NHS over the period 2002 to 2010 (Table 1). The number of PCIs
has increased markedly over time and the number of CABG surgery has fallen, which
suggests that the two procedures are potentially substitutes.
Table 1: Treated patients and average waiting times by year and procedure
Years
PCI CABG surgery
Patients
Treated
Average
waiting time (days)
Patients
treated
Average
waiting time (days)
Pooled sample 211,589 57.6 109,487 83.2
2002 16,099 89.8 14,661 153.5
2003 20,144 93.0 14,219 106.1
2004 24,358 83.7 14,074 98.3
2005 25,632 56.5 12,060 65.4
2006 26,775 52.5 11,536 65.9
2007 25,553 44.3 12,218 64.4
2008 25,404 37.4 11,831 57.8
2009 23,862 40.0 10,000 49.5
2010 23,762 39.2 8,888 50.4
Waiting times for both procedures have declined sharply over time (Table 1). Figure 1(a) and
Figure 1(b) illustrate the trends in the average waiting time by income deprivation for the two
revascularisation procedures. PCI patients living in the most deprived LSOA
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longer that those patients living in the least deprived areas (Q5) in all years. This is also true
for CABG patients until 2008. From 2008 the most deprived patients received treatment more
quickly compared to the least deprived.
Table 2: Sample descriptive statistics by procedure.
Mean PCI Mean CABG
Waiting Times (days) 57.57 83.17
EDI Income - 1st Quintile (most deprived) 18.66% 19.13%
EDI Income - 2nd Quintile 19.70% 20.09%
EDI Income - 3rd Quintile 20.89% 20.89%
EDI Income - 4th Quintile 20.92% 20.82%
EDI Income - 5th Quintile 19.82% 19.07%
Patient bypasses the closest hospital 38.61% 35.96%
Number of diagnosis 4.37 5.72
Emergency utilization in the past 365 days 0.37 0.28
Patient age 64.09 65.33
Patient is female 25.85% 18.09%
Distance between patients LSOA and chosen hospital (km) 24.53 32.41
Congestive Heart Failure 2.45% 7.09%
Peripheral Vascular Disease 4.16% 7.36%
Cerebrovascular Disease 0.63% 2.74%
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 7.01% 8.55%
Rheumatoid Disease 0.86% 0.99%
Peptic Ulcer Disease 0.17% 0.43%
Mild Liver Disease 0.16% 0.19%
Diabetes 16.76% 20.76%
Diabetes & Complications 0.59% 0.98%
Renal Disease 2.52% 3.48%
Cancer 0.73% 0.82%
Admission Month: January 8.31% 8.53%
Admission Month: February 8.48% 8.06%
Admission Month: March 9.19% 8.62%
Admission Month: April 7.79% 8.14%
Admission Month: May 7.76% 8.26%
Admission Month: June 8.74% 8.92%
Admission Month: July 8.80% 8.79%
Admission Month: August 7.96% 8.50%
Admission Month: September 8.54% 8.72%
Admission Month: October 8.67% 8.72%
Admission Month: November 9.01% 8.52%
Admission Month: December 6.75% 6.23%
Distance between the closest and second closest hospital (CABG) 22.15
Distance between the closest and second closest hospital (PCI) 16.07
Difference in distances to the closest CABG and PCI hospitals* 12.92 10.80
Notes. EDI = Economic Deprivation Index. * Difference between i) the average distance from patient address
to the three closest hospitals offering CABG and ii) the average distance from patient address to the three closest
hospitals offering PCI.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the patient sample. Both PCI and CABG patients are
on average 64-65 years old and over three quarters are male. PCI patients have fewer
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comorbidities and have been admitted to hospital as an emergency more frequently in the
preceding year compared to CABG patients. Both patient groups exhibit a similar
socioeconomic composition. The average distance travelled to the chosen hospital is higher
for CABG patients (32km) than for PCI patients (26km) since fewer hospitals offer this
procedure. More than 35% of all patients have bypassed the closest hospital.
The exclusion restriction variables (discussed in Section 3.2) are based on differential
distance between the closest and second closest hospital, and are reported at the bottom of
Table 2. For patients who underwent CABG surgery, the average difference between the
closest and second closest hospital is 22km, and for a quarter of patients exceeds 42km. For
patients who had PCI the differential distance between the closest and second closest hospital
is 16km and exceeds 33km for a quarter of patients.
Table A1 in the Appendix shows mean waiting time, proportion of patients bypassing the
closest hospital, and mean differential distance by procedure, year and quintile of the EDI
distribution.
5.2 Socioeconomic gradient, not accounting for patients choices
Table 3 and Table 4 show the effect of income deprivation on waiting time for CABG and
PCI patients, respectively. These results control for a number of factors but are not adjusted
for self-selection. The inequality gradient is statistically significant at 1% level for the two
most deprived income quintiles in each year for PCI and for most years for CABG.
Figure 1(c) and Figure 1(d) plot conditional waiting times in days, after applying a Duan
smearing adjustment. In 2002, CABG patients who were most deprived waited 48 days
([188.9-140.7]/140.7 = 34%) longer than the least deprived patients. The effect reduced over
time, but remained between 18% and 10% in all years after 2005. The relative waiting time
inequality is larger for patients who underwent PCI. In 2002, patients who were most
deprived waited 53% longer than the least deprived patients. The gap is at least 18% in all
years up to 2007 and at least 12% thereafter.
15
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Differences in trends shown in Figure 1(a) and Figure 1(c) are due to covariate adjustment. Figure 1(a) shows
the mean of the actual (i.e. observed) waiting times, stratified by income deprivation quintiles. Figure 1(c)
shows the conditional mean waiting times by income deprivation quintiles that are obtained from the regression
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Most of the case-mix variables showed the expected sign and were statistically significant in
most specifications. In particular, the effect of the number of past hospital emergency
admissions in the previous year is negative and significant at 1% level for both CABG and
PCI patients, which is consistent with prioritisation on severity. Conversely, covariates like
age and the number of secondary co-morbidity diagnosis are not always significant and are
often associated with longer waiting times. The unexpected sign may indicate that these
variables do not proxy severity related to cardiovascular pathology under treatment but reflect
other unobserved factors that may prolong waits (e.g. propensity to miss outpatient
appointments), or may require postponing revascularization treatment (e.g. co-morbidities not
yet adequately treated).
We also estimated quintile regression models and found a similar pattern of inequalities at
different percentiles of the waiting time distribution (see Appendix E).
model controlling for case-mix. The divergence between figures after 2007 is driven by the case-mix
adjustment; not to the smearing adjustment. The latter is set to be constant within procedures and equal across
deprivation quintiles in order to allow for comparison.
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Table 3: Effect of income deprivation (quintiles of yearly income deprivation distribution) on the log of CABG waiting times, by year.
Notes. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, admission month, Charlson comorbidities dummies, gender, number of secondary diagnoses, past emergency utilization, hospital
fixed effects. EDI = Economic Deprivation Index. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EDI income 1st quintile
(most deprived)
0.2942*** 0.2333*** 0.1681*** 0.1346*** 0.1627*** 0.1260*** 0.0702** 0.0779*** 0.0921**
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2092*** 0.1871*** 0.1013*** 0.1150*** 0.1451*** 0.1623*** 0.0656** 0.0819*** 0.0935**
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1529*** 0.0903** 0.1341*** 0.0983*** 0.0834** 0.0724*** 0.0485* 0.0270 0.0648*
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0221 0.0582* 0.0528** 0.0628** 0.0343 0.0947*** 0.0279 0.0081 0.0326
Constant 4.2215*** 4.0960*** 4.0651*** 3.6726*** 3.7363*** 3.6791*** 3.6018*** 3.4662*** 3.4424***
Patient Age (demeaned) 0.0007 0.0024 0.0055 0.0001 0.0034 0.0040 0.0016 -0.0012 0.0065**
Female Patient 0.0684** 0.0658** 0.0544*** 0.0537** 0.0363 0.0390* 0.0613*** 0.0658** -0.0078
Num. of Diagnosis -0.0005 0.0198** 0.0099* 0.0129** 0.0057 0.0151*** 0.0163*** 0.0067 0.0063
Emergency Past
Admissions past year
-0.2736*** -0.2428*** -0.2050*** -0.1316*** -0.1132*** -0.1181*** -0.1274*** -0.0668*** -0.0808***
Patients 14654 14213 14074 12060 11536 12218 11829 10000 8888
Hospital Sites 32 35 34 32 32 33 34 32 32
R
2
0.19 0.19 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.15
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Table 4: Effect of income deprivation (quintiles of yearly income deprivation distribution) on log of PCI waiting times, by year.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EDI income 1st quintile
(most deprived)
0.4231*** 0.3164*** 0.2306*** 0.1637*** 0.1688*** 0.1667*** 0.1098*** 0.1217*** 0.1381***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.3402*** 0.2654*** 0.1980*** 0.1581*** 0.1638*** 0.1204*** 0.0954*** 0.1186*** 0.1193***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2402*** 0.1569*** 0.1102*** 0.1164*** 0.1171*** 0.0924*** 0.0986*** 0.0887*** 0.0966***
EDI income 4th quintile 0.1078*** 0.0931*** 0.0487** 0.0361* 0.0667*** 0.0667*** 0.0520*** 0.0539** 0.0490**
Constant 3.7968*** 3.9128*** 3.9489*** 3.5820*** 3.5585*** 3.2195*** 3.2286*** 3.1844*** 3.2231***
Patient Age (demeaned) -0.0004 0.0039 0.0012 0.0016 0.0039*** 0.0040** 0.0035** 0.0025 0.0001
Female Patient 0.1062*** 0.0673*** 0.0691*** 0.0501*** 0.0467*** 0.0490*** 0.0389*** 0.0281*** 0.0184*
Num. of Diagnosis 0.0254** 0.0256** 0.0168* 0.0232*** 0.0192*** 0.0225** 0.0153*** 0.0196*** 0.0223***
Emergency Past
Admissions past year
-0.1973*** -0.1844*** -0.1282*** -0.0895*** -0.0842*** -0.0628*** -0.0402*** -0.0271*** -0.0219**
Patients 16095 20140 24355 25632 26772 25545 25399 23861 23759
Hospital Sites 37 42 44 52 60 66 73 76 83
R
2
0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.16
Notes. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, admission month, Charlson comorbidities dummies, gender, number of secondary diagnoses, past emergency utilization, hospital
fixed effects. EDI = Economic Deprivation Index. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure 1: Actual and estimated absolute and percentage income-related inequalities in waiting times over years 2002/2010.
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5.3 Switching regression for bypassing the closest hospital
Tables 5 and 6 show the effect of income deprivation on waiting times accounting for self-selection
due to bypassing the closest hospital.
16
CABG and PCI patients are analysed separately. In almost
every year, the selection correction term is statistically significant, providing evidence of self-
selection. In both samples, the first stage probit suggests that less deprived patients are more mobile
(either due to a stronger preference for shorter waits and higher quality, or fewer constraints and
difficulties with travelling) and therefore inclined to bypass the closest hospital than more deprived
patients. A higher differential distance between providers (our exclusion restriction) is associated
with a lower probability of bypassing the local hospital and it is always statistically significant at
the 1% level for both procedures.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 plot the conditional estimates (in days) from the Roy model allowing for
bypassing the closest hospital. Until 2006, the socioeconomic gradient for patients bypassing their
local hospital is less pronounced than for those treated at their local hospital for both procedures.
The most deprived CABG (PCI) patients admitted to their local hospital waited around 44% (54%)
longer in 2002 and 11% (15%) longer in 2010 compared to the least deprived patients. Instead, the
most deprived CABG (PCI) patients who bypassed their local hospital waited 18% (50%) longer in
2002 and 7% (15%) longer in 2010. From 2008 onwards the gradient tends to fade away in size and
is not always statistically significant for CABG patients, while it remains statistically significant for
PCI patients. Overall, the second stage regressions confirm the presence of significant (both
quantitatively and statistically) socioeconomic gradients in waiting times for both patients
bypassing and attending their local hospital.
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We also formally test for the hypothesis of switching regimes by revascularisation procedure and by choice of closest
hospital bypassing, through a Chow test (Chow, 1960); and for the common support of the propensity score across self-
selection arms, via histograms. Results are reported respectively in Appendices B and C and confirm both the switching
regimes hypothesis and the presence of a substantial common support for the propensity score.
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Table 5: Roy model. Income inequalities in CABG waiting times, accounting for selection of hospital.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Patients not choosing the closest CABG hospital site  Equation (4)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.1671*** 0.2229*** 0.2274*** 0.0818* 0.1429*** 0.1636*** 0.0153 0.0976** 0.0660
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.1086** 0.1947*** 0.0856* 0.0797* 0.1353*** 0.1760*** 0.0150 0.1095** 0.1583***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.0474 0.0807* 0.1564*** 0.0716* 0.0690 0.1062*** 0.0421 0.0724 0.0227
EDI income 4th quintile -0.0035 0.0691 0.0381 0.0272 0.0104 0.1395*** 0.0076 0.0265 0.0484
IMR1 - Not closest 0.1277** 0.1970*** 0.2664*** 0.0086 -0.0465 0.0187 0.1122** 0.0505 -0.0653
Constant 4.3941*** 4.1392*** 4.3827*** 3.7694*** 3.7312*** 3.6206*** 3.6255*** 3.6014*** 3.3693***
Patients choosing the closest CABG hospital site  Equation (5)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.3666*** 0.2527*** 0.1469*** 0.1687*** 0.1762*** 0.1089*** 0.1114*** 0.0692** 0.1020***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2711*** 0.1846*** 0.1166*** 0.1405*** 0.1523*** 0.1535*** 0.0985*** 0.0708** 0.0608*
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2172*** 0.1045*** 0.1287*** 0.1172*** 0.0933*** 0.0514* 0.0689** 0.0057 0.0847**
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0427 0.0577 0.0690** 0.0883*** 0.0513 0.0693** 0.0433 -0.0009 0.0265
IMR0  Closest -0.0174 -0.0091 -0.0988** -0.0172 0.0281 -0.0234 0.0522 0.0014 0.0719**
Constant 4.1892*** 4.1937*** 4.0696*** 3.6239*** 3.7021*** 3.7343*** 3.6118*** 3.4253*** 3.4176***
1
st
Stage Probit for Choice of provider by distance: CLOSEST vs NOT CLOSEST hospital - only CABG  Equation (3)
Distance difference 2nd -
1st provider
-0.0339*** -0.0184*** -0.0182*** -0.0316*** -0.0366*** -0.0282*** -0.0318*** -0.0329*** -0.0380***
EDI income 1st quintile -0.1832*** -0.2132*** -0.2065*** -0.2825*** -0.3233*** -0.2321*** -0.2405*** -0.1738*** -0.1348***
EDI income 2nd quintile -0.0185 -0.0361 -0.0186 -0.0800** -0.0185 -0.0854** -0.0165 -0.0561 -0.0017
EDI income 3rd quintile -0.0233 -0.0503 -0.0229 -0.0110 -0.0868** -0.0273 -0.0725* 0.0130 0.0187
EDI income 4th quintile -0.0265 -0.0171 -0.0426 -0.0313 -0.0706* -0.0546 0.0397 0.0268 0.0591
Constant 0.2726*** 0.1231** 0.0626 0.2071*** 0.2775*** 0.1454** 0.1883*** 0.1853*** 0.2735***
Patients 14654 14213 14074 12060 11536 12218 11829 10000 8888
Chi-squared p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.18
Notes. Roy model on CABG sample based on Model (2). Exclusion restriction in the 1
st
stage regression: differential distance between second closest and closest
CABG hospital site. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, admission month, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past
utilization in the previous year, hospital fixed effects (excluded in 1
st
stage probit choice). IMR = Parametric selection correction (Inverse Mills Ratio). EDI =
Economic Deprivation Index. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 6: Roy model. Income inequalities in PCI waiting times, accounting for selection of hospital.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Patients not choosing the closest PCI hospital site  Equation (4)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.4043*** 0.2845*** 0.1846*** 0.1478*** 0.1422*** 0.2120*** 0.1269*** 0.1496*** 0.1425***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.3251*** 0.2956*** 0.1930*** 0.1516*** 0.1340*** 0.1537*** 0.1314*** 0.1612*** 0.1119***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2375*** 0.1595*** 0.0912*** 0.1169*** 0.0881*** 0.1424*** 0.1174*** 0.1277*** 0.0824***
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0710 0.0890** 0.0013 0.0474* 0.0645** 0.1115*** 0.0717*** 0.0980*** 0.0771***
IMR1 - Not Closest -0.1001** -0.0272 -0.0386 -0.0018 -0.0648** -0.0106 -0.0575** 0.0263 -0.0054
Constant 3.5600*** 3.8989*** 3.8665*** 3.5116*** 3.4935*** 3.1513*** 3.1757*** 3.2392*** 3.2156***
Patients choosing the closest PCI hospital site  Equation (5)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.4344*** 0.3219*** 0.2493*** 0.1747*** 0.1841*** 0.1363*** 0.1004*** 0.1090*** 0.1374***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.3447*** 0.2394*** 0.1992*** 0.1634*** 0.1868*** 0.0966*** 0.0735*** 0.0946*** 0.1228***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2412*** 0.1471*** 0.1204*** 0.1171*** 0.1362*** 0.0537** 0.0855*** 0.0689*** 0.1061***
EDI income 4th quintile 0.1292*** 0.0909*** 0.0735*** 0.0292 0.0654*** 0.0333 0.0400* 0.0301 0.0336
IMR0 - Closest 0.1104*** 0.0279 -0.0073 -0.0035 -0.0267 -0.0093 -0.0102 0.0286 0.0037
Constant 3.8188*** 3.9022*** 3.9710*** 3.6293*** 3.5824*** 3.2653*** 3.2319*** 3.1540*** 3.2218***
1
st
Stage Probit for Choice of provider by distance: CLOSEST vs NOT CLOSEST hospital - only PCI  Equation (3)
Distance difference 2nd - 1st
provider
-0.0342*** -0.0419*** -0.0385*** -0.0408*** -0.0174*** -0.0224*** -0.0302*** -0.0422*** -0.0423***
EDI income 1st quintile -0.3843*** -0.3981*** -0.3217*** -0.2464*** -0.1281*** -0.0521** -0.0282 -0.1350*** -0.1433***
EDI income 2nd quintile -0.1111*** -0.1223*** -0.0101 -0.0190 -0.0220 0.0588** 0.0614** -0.0193 -0.0569**
EDI income 3rd quintile -0.0792** -0.0775** -0.0409 -0.0400 0.0102 0.0317 0.0642** 0.0313 0.0308
EDI income 4th quintile -0.0871*** -0.0644** -0.0442 -0.0030 -0.0008 -0.0036 0.1045*** 0.0278 0.0270
Constant 0.2822*** 0.3393*** 0.2140*** 0.3757*** 0.0823** 0.1052*** 0.0909** 0.0974** 0.1691***
Patients 16095 20140 24355 25632 26772 25545 25399 23861 23759
Chi-squared p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.1 0.09
Notes. Roy model on PCI sample based on Model (2). Exclusion restriction in the 1
st
stage regression: differential distance between second closest and closest PCI
hospital site. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, admission month, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization in
the previous year, hospital fixed effects (excuded in 1
st
stage probit choice). IMR = Parametric selection correction (Inverse Mills Ratio). EDI = Economic
Deprivation Index. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure 2: Estimated CABG waiting times for patients choosing the closest hospital and bypassing the local hospital by deprivation quintile.
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Figure 3: Estimated PCI waiting times for patients choosing the closest hospital and bypassing the local hospital by deprivation quintile.
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By design, the magnitude of the overall gradient in waiting time is a weighted average of the two
estimated gradients of the switching regression model, with weights equal to the proportion of
patients bypassing the local hospital. We utilise this property to calculate the overall gradient
after adjusting for selection and compare this to the gradient in Section 5.2 which does not adjust
for selection. Table 7 provides i) the expected waiting time for the most (Q1) / least (Q5)
deprived patient groups in a given year based on the unadjusted pooled gradient (Columns B and
C), ii) the gradient for patients bypassing (D and E) and not bypassing the closest hospital (F and
G), and iii) the overall adjusted gradient (H and I).
Columns L and M in Table 7 show how the adjusted overall gradient differs from the unadjusted
gradient, both in absolute and relative terms. The results suggest that the unadjusted model
exhibits a larger socioeconomic waiting time gradient by up to 12% for CABG patients and by
up to 7% for PCI patients.
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Table 7: Differences in the estimates of the overall waiting time gradient (in days) with and without adjusting for selection into hospitals.
Pooled -
unadjusted
Roy model 
bypassing closest
hospital
Roy model 
choosing closest
hospital
Pooled 
adjusted
Difference in estimates
between unadjusted
and adjusted waiting
time gradient
A B C D E F G H I L M
Year Procedure
% Bypassing
local hospital
Q1 Q5 Q1 Q5 Q1 Q5 Q1 Q5 Absolute Relative
2002 CABG 35.9% 188.9 140.7 143.1 121.1 177.6 123.1 165.2 122.4 -5.37 -11.0%
2003 CABG 40.4% 127.5 101 94 75.2 118.4 92 108.5 85.2 -3.17 -12.0%
2004 CABG 39.0% 109.2 92.3 87 69.3 95.4 82.4 92.1 77.3 -2.07 -12.1%
2005 CABG 34.9% 70.6 61.7 66.3 61.1 67.5 57 67.1 58.4 -0.25 -2.7%
2006 CABG 35.3% 73.7 62.6 72.5 62.8 70.5 59.1 71.2 60.4 -0.30 -2.7%
2007 CABG 36.0% 68.7 60.6 64.1 54.4 62.1 55.7 62.8 55.2 -0.51 -6.8%
2008 CABG 34.8% 60.7 56.6 50.5 49.7 59.3 53 56.2 51.9 0.29 5.6%
2009 CABG 33.0% 52.5 48.6 48.3 43.8 48.7 45.4 48.6 44.9 -0.20 -7.0%
2010 CABG 31.3% 53.9 49.1 53.1 49.7 52.5 47.4 52.7 48.1 -0.23 -3.8%
2002 PCI 35.4% 114.2 74.8 112.8 75.3 115.4 74.7 114.5 74.9 0.17 0.3%
2003 PCI 36.7% 111.8 81.5 101 76 109 79 106.1 77.9 -2.13 -7.1%
2004 PCI 34.3% 96 76.2 91.8 76.3 92.3 72 92.1 73.5 -1.15 -5.4%
2005 PCI 40.4% 61.5 52.2 58.6 50.5 60.1 50.5 59.5 50.5 -0.31 -3.1%
2006 PCI 44.0% 56.9 48.1 57.8 50.1 54.5 45.3 56.0 47.4 -0.26 -3.9%
2007 PCI 41.7% 48.7 41.2 47.8 38.7 45.8 39.9 46.6 39.4 -0.27 -3.5%
2008 PCI 40.6% 39.1 35 38.8 34.2 37.2 33.6 37.8 33.8 -0.09 -1.8%
2009 PCI 35.6% 41.6 36.8 38 32.7 39.1 35.1 38.7 34.2 -0.34 -6.0%
2010 PCI 36.3% 42.1 36.6 39.9 34.6 40.4 35.2 40.2 35.0 -0.26 -3.7%
Notes. Q1 (Q5) = patients living in most (least) income-deprived English LSOAs. A = Percentage of patients bypassing the closest hospital. B, C = baseline OLS estimates of
average waiting time for most (Q1) / least (Q5) income-deprived patients (Eq.(1)). D, E = Roy model estimates of average waiting time for most/least income-deprived patients
bypassing the closest hospital (Eq.(4))..F, G = Roy model estimates of average waiting time for most/least income-deprived patients choosing the closest hospital (Eq.(5)). H =
A*D+(1-A)*F = estimates of average waiting time for most income-deprived patients, after correction for self-selection. I = A*E+(1-A)*G = estimates of average waiting time for
least income-deprived patients, after correction for self-selection. L = (H-I)-(B-C) = absolute difference in the SES waiting time gradient due to selection. M = [(H-I)-(B-C)] / (B-C)
= percentage difference in the SES waiting time gradient due to selection.
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Table 8: Roy model. Income inequalities in waiting times on CABG and PCI samples, after accounting for selection of revascularisation procedure.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Patients choosing CABG  Equation (4)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.3605*** 0.2238*** 0.1614*** 0.1319*** 0.1544*** 0.1260*** 0.0695*** 0.0783*** 0.0927***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2557*** 0.1711*** 0.1028*** 0.1107*** 0.1425*** 0.1623*** 0.0708*** 0.0809*** 0.0925***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1868*** 0.0894*** 0.1423*** 0.0959*** 0.0878*** 0.0724*** 0.0481* 0.0267 0.0679**
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0450 0.0685** 0.0602** 0.0578** 0.0336 0.0947*** 0.0225 0.0080 0.0300
IMR1 - CABG -0.5930** 0.7736** 0.5971** 0.1162 0.3761 -0.0025 -0.2828 0.1087 0.1413
Constant 3.9205*** 4.7000*** 4.2609*** 3.8637*** 4.2500*** 3.9414*** 3.0829*** 3.2087*** 3.3728***
Patients choosing PCI  Equation (5)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.5063*** 0.3105*** 0.2323*** 0.1661*** 0.1688*** 0.1670*** 0.1093*** 0.1189*** 0.1364***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.3974*** 0.2556*** 0.1977*** 0.1622*** 0.1638*** 0.1193*** 0.0988*** 0.1215*** 0.1214***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2819*** 0.1568*** 0.1083*** 0.1189*** 0.1171*** 0.0903*** 0.0985*** 0.0898*** 0.0906***
EDI income 4th quintile 0.1365*** 0.0998*** 0.0469** 0.0406** 0.0667*** 0.0672*** 0.0486*** 0.0547*** 0.0541***
IMR0 - PCI -0.7795* 0.5696 -0.1959 -0.1536 0.0035 0.1766 -0.2522 -0.5481*** -0.4976***
Constant 4.2005*** 3.5923*** 4.1968*** 3.6976*** 3.5055*** 3.0236*** 3.5466*** 3.4960*** 3.4379***
1
st
Stage Probit for Choice of procedure: CABG vs PCI  Equation (3)
Differential distance of first 3
hospitals by procedure
-0.0016*** 0.0001 -0.0013*** -0.0008** -0.0004 0.0009*** -0.0003 -0.0008** -0.0020***
EDI income 1st quintile 0.1810*** 0.0191 0.0173 0.0338 0.0295 -0.0008 -0.0030 -0.0087 -0.0053
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.1254*** 0.0314 -0.0024 0.0543** 0.0077 0.0148 0.0281 0.0139 0.0104
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.0909*** 0.0016 -0.0176 0.0314 -0.0171 0.0252 -0.0014 0.0039 -0.0300
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0636*** -0.0210 -0.0177 0.0612*** 0.0017 -0.0050 -0.0284 0.0013 0.0282
Constant -0.0714** -0.1671*** -0.3132*** -0.4841*** -0.4246*** -0.2987*** -0.3746*** -0.4634*** -0.5697***
Patients 30749 34353 38429 37692 38308 37763 37228 33861 32647
Chi2_pval 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R^2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.13
Notes. Roy model on joint CABG and PCI samples. Exclusion restriction in the 1
st
stage regression: (average) distance between the three closest hospitals providing
CABG and the three closest hospitals providing PCI. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, admission month, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of
diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization previous year, hospital fixed effects (except for 1
st
stage probit choice). IMR = Parametric selection correction (Inverse Mills
Ratio). EDI = Economic Deprivation Index. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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5.4 Switching regressions for choice of procedure
Table 8 shows the effect of income deprivation on waiting times accounting for self-selection
into revascularisation procedure. The first stage probit suggests that SES is not associated
with the choice of treatment alternative. However, the IMRs are statistically significant at 5%
level in 5 of 9 years. Accounting for self-selection into treatment has negligible effects on the
estimated socioeconomic gradient. Because policy makers are usually concerned with waiting
times for individual cardiac revascularisation procedures, we do not calculate an adjusted
overall gradient.
The coefficient of the exclusion restriction variable in the first stage regression is negative
and statistically significant at 1% level in five of the nine years analysed. As expected, a
larger differential distance to CABG provider reduces the probability of choosing CABG
surgery.
The results are qualitatively similar (and available upon request from the authors) when we
used waiting times as opposed to its log transformation, though the SES gradient is less
pronounced. The appropriateness of employing the logarithmic transformation of waiting
times versus the actual waits has been formally tested with Akaike and Bayesian Information
Criteria, Shapiro-Francia normality test, Breusch-Pagan and Cameron-Trivedi
heteroscedasticity tests, and non-parametric graphical inspection methods (i.e. histograms of
regression residuals). The results support the use of the log transformation.
5.5 Value of health forgone while waiting for treatment
Figure 4 shows the individual monetary value of the health forgone while waiting for
revascularisation by SES. This is based on Eq.(6) with ÖgW computed from the Roy model
results (Eq.(4) and Eq.(5)) weighted by the proportion of patients bypassing the closest
hospital (i.e. the adjusted overall gradient). CABG patients forgo more health while waiting
than PCI patient because they wait longer and because CABG surgery is more effective
(larger health benefit). Patients living in most deprived areas bear larger losses than those in
the average or least deprived LSOAs due to the unfavourable waiting time gradient. The
differences between the most and least deprived patients are very large in the early years of
the sample, and amount to approximately £850 for CABG and £715 for PCI in 2002. These
socioeconomic inequality gaps reduce sharply over time in line with the waiting time
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gradient, but do not disappear. In 2010, the waiting time gap between most and least deprived
patients is worth approximately £90 for both CABG and PCI patients. Comparing this to a
hypothetical scenario in which waiting times across all patients are equal to the national
average
17
the total re-distributing effect of waiting time inequalities is about £295,000 for
CABG patients and £750,000 for PCI patients in 2010 alone.
Figure 4: Estimated monetary value of health forgone while waiting (by procedure and deprivation
quintile).
6 Robustness checks
6.1 Hospital characteristics and choice of bypassing the closest hospital
The choice of bypassing the closest hospital may be a function not only of the distance to
providers, but also their quality and waiting times. A recent study by Gaynor et al. (2016)
shows that CABG patients in England are more likely to choose hospitals with higher quality,
as measured by lower risk-adjusted mortality, when patient choice policies were enhanced,
but are not sensitive to variations in waiting times.
17
In a capacity constrained health system, reductions in waiting times for the more deprived are likely to be
achieved through increases for the less deprived.
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We investigate whether the SES gradient in waiting times shown in Table 7 (based on the
selection equations of bypassing the local hospital in Tables 5 and 6) is robust to the inclusion
of quality and waiting times in the selection equations. To avoid simultaneity bias between
volume and quality (e.g. due to learning-by-doing or congestion effects), we include quality
and waiting times lagged by one year, which is also consistent with a demand specification
with adaptive expectations.
18
The quality and wait indicators are computed, similarly to the distance variables, as
differences to the closest provider. For each revascularization procedure (CABG, PCI), the
differential quality and waiting times variables are computed respectively as  ? ൌ തହ െ ଵ
and  ? ൌ ഥହ െ ଵ , where q1 and w1 are hospital quality and waiting times in the closest
(hospital) Trust, lagged by one year, and qത
5
and wഥ5 are the average quality and waiting times
in the 5 second closest Trusts, lagged by one year.
As a proxy of quality we use standardized mortality rates computed according to the Dr
Foster Intelligence methodology.
19
As a proxy of wait we compute the proportion of patients
waiting in excess of the 3
rd
quartile (e.g. 75%) of the procedure-specific wait distributions.
The latter is in line with evidence suggesting that patients dislike long waiting times
(Gutacker et al., 2016). As an additional indicator of hospital quality, we include a dummy
variable when the closest hospital is predominantly a specialist cardiothoracic hospital:
patients should be less likely to bypass the closest hospital if it is a specialist one.
The use of lagged variables reduces the sample in the presence of hospital entry since we
cannot include lagged quality and waiting times for hospitals entering the market in a given
year.
20
We therefore also estimate the Roy models based on the restricted sample with the
selection equations including distance but excluding quality and waiting times (as in the main
model in Section 5) to isolate the effect of the latter variables from changes to the sample.
The key results are reported in Table 9. Columns A, B and C report respectively the
proportionate difference in waiting times between the lowest and highest SES group when the
selection equation includes: i) distance only; ii) distance, quality and waiting times on the
restricted sample, and iii) distance only on the restricted sample. The gradients are very
18
The use of lagged hospitals characteristics is in line with previous studies on hospital choice (Beukers et al.,
2014; Gutacker et al., 2016; Moscelli et al., 2016).
19
See http://www.drfoster.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/HSMR_Toolkit_Version_9_July_2014.pdf.
20
During the period 2002-2010, the number of hospital sites offering PCI almost tripled but stayed
approximately constant for CABG.
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similar under the three specifications, and we therefore conclude that our results are robust to
the inclusion of quality and waiting times in the selection equations.
The selection equations are shown in Tables F1 and F2 in the Appendix. For CABG, Table
F1 shows that after the introduction of patient choice in 2006 patients are more likely to
choose hospitals with lower mortality. This is not the case before the choice policies and
likely to reflect the restricted choice that patients faced. Patients are more likely to bypass the
local hospital when waiting times are long throughout the period considered, except for the
last two years when waiting times were very short and may act as residual category of
reputation (hospitals with high demand have longer waits). The results are plausible and in
line with Gaynor et al (2016) which show that CABG patients choose hospitals by lower
mortality when patient choice policies were enhanced.
21
6.2 Patient severity, SES and choice of revascularization procedure
A possible concern is that the choice between CABG and PCI is limited only to the most
severe patients, especially in last period of our sample when PCI seems to increasingly
substitute for CABG. If the most severe patients also come from the most deprived areas,
then the estimates of the selection equation might be biased. To ascertain whether this is the
case, we estimate also a Roy Model with choice between CABG and PCI, whose selection
equation allows for interaction terms between the SES indicators and: i) the number of past
emergency admissions; and ii) the number of co-morbidities.
The results are reported in Table 10, which compares the SES gradient in waiting times with
(column B) and without (column A) the interactions. The results are very similar. For
completeness, the coefficients of the Roy Model are shown in Appendix Table G1 and are in
line with Table 8: patients become more likely to choose CABG over PCI as the number of
21
For PCI, Table F2 shows that after 2006 patients were less likely to bypass their closest hospital if it was a
specialist cardiothoracic centre. They are also more likely to bypass their closest hospital when waiting times are
long in the first three years but this is not so in the later years when the coefficients are positive and again this
could be due to the shorter waiting times acting as a proxy of reputation. The coefficients on mortality go from
positive in the first three years to negative in the following two years, which is to some extent in line with
CABG results, but are positive in the last four years. The counter-intuitive results for the latter could be due to
the smaller variation of mortality in PCI (since the risk of mortality is low, i.e. 0.36% in our sample), the
limitation imposed by the reduced-form modelling using a probit model instead of more complex discrete
choice model, and the fact that the specialisation dummy discussed above may act as a better quality indicator
than mortality.
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co-morbidities increases and the number of past emergency admissions decreases
22
, but the
interactions terms with the SES are mostly insignificant.
6.3 Patient costs, SES and choice of revascularization procedure
The choice between CABG and PCI could be a function of the expected recovery time and
costs. CABG surgery requires considerably more recovery time than PCI, with an in-hospital
Length of Stay (LoS) of 7 to 10 days, and a full expected recovery after 12 weeks, compared
to a 1 to 2 days in-hospital LoS and a week recovery period for PCI. These differences in LoS
and recovery time might affect differently the choice of individuals with different SES.
To allow for this, we estimate a Roy Model where the selection equation between CABG and
PCI allows for differences in LoS between the two procedures. More precisely, we compute
the difference in the average LoS between the two procedures,  ? ൌ തതതതതେ୅୆ୋ െ തതതതത୔େ୍,
where LoSതതതതതେ୅୆ୋ and LoSതതതതത୔େ୍ are averaged across the five closest hospitals.  ?represents a
proxy of differential expected recovery costs, which may affect the choice of CABG vs.
PCI.
23
The selection equation of the Roy Model includes i)  ?and ii) the interactions
between  ?and SES.
The SES gradient in waiting times based on this Roy model is reported in column D of Table
10. The gradient is very similar to our baseline one (in column A). The results are therefore
robust to this extension. (Full results of the Roy model are reported in the Appendix, Table
G2 and are in line with Table 8). The selection equation suggests that patients prefer CABG
RYHU3&,WKHVKRUWHULVWKHDYHUDJH/R6IRU&$%*FRPSDUHGWR3&,7KHHIIHFWRI¨/R6DQG
its interaction terms with SES are mostly insignificant, except for the most deprived patients
in 2007 and 2008.
22
The same pattern arises in Table 8, whose full estimation results of the selection equation are reported in the
Appendix, Table G3, Panel C.
23
We do not have information regarding out-of-hospital recovery costs for the two procedures. We assume that
the out-of-hospital recovery costs are positively correlated to the in-hospital length of stay.
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Table 9. Comparison of SES gradient controlling for selection due to patients bypassing the closest hospital.
A B C D E
Year Sample
% bypassing
closest
hospital
Smaller
sample due to
hospital entry
% bypassing
closest hospital;
Smaller sample
SES gradient SES gradient 95% Confidence
Intervals
SES gradient 95% Confidence
Intervals
CABG
2002 14,661 35.9% 14,654 35.9% 34.9% 34.5% [23.1%; 46.0%] 34.9% [23.4%; 46.4%]
2003 14,219 40.4% 13,678 38.4% 27.2% 27.6% [17.1%; 38.2%] 27.6% [17.1%; 38.1%]
2004 14,074 39.0% 14,074 39.0% 19.6% 19.6% [10.5%; 28.8%] 19.6% [10.5%; 28.7%]
2005 12,060 34.9% 12,060 34.9% 14.9% 14.9% [6.8%; 23.0%] 14.9% [6.9%; 23.0%]
2006 11,536 35.3% 11,536 35.3% 17.9% 17.9% [9.6%; 26.2%] 17.9% [9.6%; 26.2%]
2007 12,218 36.0% 11,245 32.3% 13.8% 13.5% [5.6%; 21.5%] 13.4% [5.5%; 21.3%]
2008 11,831 34.8% 11,635 33.9% 8.2% 8.3% [0.8%; 15.8%] 8.4% [0.9%; 15.9%]
2009 10,000 33.0% 10,000 33.0% 8.2% 8.1% [-0.2%; 16.3%] 8.2% [-0.1%; 16.4%]
2010 8,888 31.3% 8,888 31.3% 9.5% 9.5% [0.6%; 18.4%] 9.5% [0.6%; 18.4%]
PCI
2002 16,099 35.4% 15,600 33.5% 52.8% 53.4% [41.1%; 65.7%] 53.4% [41.1%; 65.7%]
2003 20,144 36.7% 18,413 32.4% 36.1% 35.6% [26.1%; 45.0%] 35.5% [26.1%; 45.0%]
2004 24,358 34.3% 23,668 33.5% 25.6% 26.5% [19.7%; 33.3%] 26.4% [19.6%; 33.2%]
2005 25,632 40.4% 20,524 29.4% 17.8% 19.3% [13.3%; 25.3%] 19.5% [13.5%; 25.5%]
2006 26,775 44.0% 23,470 39.3% 18.0% 18.0% [12.5%; 23.6%] 18.0% [12.5%; 23.6%]
2007 25,553 41.7% 21,814 36.2% 18.4% 17.4% [11.6%; 23.3%] 17.4% [11.5%; 23.2%]
2008 25,404 40.6% 22,767 36.6% 11.8% 11.8% [6.6%; 17.0%] 11.8% [6.6%; 17.0%]
2009 23,862 35.6% 22,609 34.0% 13.2% 12.8% [7.5%; 18.2%] 12.8% [7.5%; 18.2%]
2010 23,762 36.3% 22,196 33.3% 14.9% 14.3% [9.0%; 19.7%] 14.2% [8.9%; 19.6%]
Controls included in the selection equation
Differential distances YES YES YES YES YES
Hospital quality and waiting times NO YES YES NO NO
Notes. A = 100*[(column H of Table 7 / column I of Table 7) -1]; B = same as A, but using estimates and samples from Tables F1 and F2, with selection accounting for distance,
hospital quality and waiting times; C = 95% confidence interval around B; D = same as C, but estimated on samples as in Tables F1 and F2, excluding hospital quality and waiting
times; E = 95% confidence interval around D.
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Table 10. Comparison of SES gradient controlling for selection due to choice of procedure.
A B C D E
Year SES gradient 95% confidence
interval
SES gradient 95% confidence
interval
CABG
2002 41.4% 36.5% [27.1%; 45.9%] 36.4% [27.0%; 45.7%]
2003 25.1% 25.7% [18.5%; 32.9%] 25.7% [18.5%; 32.9%]
2004 17.4% 17.4% [11.1%; 23.7%] 17.7% [11.4%; 24.0%]
2005 14.1% 14.3% [8.5%; 20.1%] 14.5% [8.7%; 20.3%]
2006 16.8% 17.4% [11.5%; 23.2%] 17.0% [11.2%; 22.9%]
2007 13.4% 13.4% [8.0%; 18.9%] 13.4% [8.0%; 18.8%]
2008 7.2% 7.2% [2.0%; 12.5%] 7.1% [1.8%; 12.4%]
2009 8.1% 8.1% [2.2%; 13.9%] 8.1% [2.2%; 14.0%]
2010 9.6% 9.6% [3.1%; 16.0%] 9.6% [3.2%; 16.0%]
PCI
2002 61.2% 56.2% [46.2%; 66.2%] 56.4% [46.5%; 66.4%]
2003 36.5% 36.8% [30.2%; 43.3%] 36.9% [30.4%; 43.4%]
2004 26.1% 25.6% [20.9%; 30.4%] 25.9% [21.2%; 30.7%]
2005 18.0% 18.0% [14.3%; 21.7%] 18.0% [14.2%; 21.7%]
2006 18.4% 18.2% [14.4%; 22.0%] 18.2% [14.4%; 22.0%]
2007 18.2% 18.2% [14.4%; 22.0%] 18.2% [14.3%; 22.0%]
2008 11.5% 11.6% [8.1%; 15.0%] 11.6% [8.1%; 15.1%]
2009 12.8% 12.8% [9.1%; 16.5%] 12.8% [9.1%; 16.5%]
2010 14.8% 14.8% [11.0%; 18.5%] 14.8% [11.0%; 18.5%]
Controls included in the selection equation
Difference in distances to the
closest CABG and PCI hospitals YES YES YES YES YES
SES * past emergency admissions NO YES YES NO NO
SES * comorbidities NO YES YES NO NO
LoS, SES * LoS NO NO NO YES YES
Notes. Column A results are from models reported in Table 8. Column B results from models in Table 8, adding
interactions terms of SES indicator variables with number of past emergency admissions and number of
comorbidities in the selection equation of the Roy Model. Column D results from models in Table 8, adding
both the average LoS (Length of Stay) in the five closest hospitals and the interactions terms of SES indicator
variables with the average LoS in the selection equation of the Roy Model. See footnote 10 for formal definition
of Difference in distances to the closest CABG and PCI hospitals.
7 Conclusions
Several studies suggest that publicly-funded health systems are prone to pro-rich inequalities
in hospital waiting times for elective procedures (Siciliani, 2016), even in countries like
England and Norway with well-funded and mature systems of universal health coverage. This
study improves our understanding of such inequalities and provides four key results and
policy insights.
First, waiting time inequalities by socioeconomic status within hospitals tend to be larger in
relative terms for complex tertiary interventions for life threatening conditions like coronary
heart disease than for conditions which are not life threatening such as osteoarthritis, which is
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frequently treated by hip replacement surgery. We find that patients living in the most
deprived fifths of small areas wait 35% longer compared to the least deprived fifths for
CABG and 53% longer for PCI in 2002, falling to 9.5% and 15% respectively in 2011. These
differences are economically meaningful: the health that more deprived CABG patients forgo
due to waiting longer than less deprived patients was worth approximately £850 per person in
2002/03, reducing to £90 in 2010/11. In contrast, Laudicella et al. (2012) estimate a 7.7% gap
in waiting time within hospitals between the most and least deprived groups of patients who
underwent hip replacement surgery in England in 2001 (see also Cooper et al., 2009, showing
smaller gaps for cataract surgery and knee replacement within and across hospitals). This
indicates that socioeconomic inequalities in waiting times may be exacerbated when patients
seek care for potentially life-threatening diseases.
Second, waiting time inequalities are not primarily due to choice of hospital or type of
treatment for the life-threating condition which we investigate. Only up to 12% of the overall
waiting time gradient is due to choice, and this effect did not increase after 2006 when the
English NHS choice reforms were introduced. Moreover, the substantial fall in pro-rich
inequality began in 2002 when average waiting times started to fall (Propper et al., 2010) but
had largely finished by 2006 when the choice policy was introduced (Cookson et al., 2012a).
The study by Gaynor et al. (2016) shows that choice of hospital for patients in need of CABG
responded to quality (in particular the more severe and low income patients) but not to
waiting times when the choice policies were introduced in 2006 (with high income patients
having at most a higher, rather than lower, willingness to travel for long waiting times; p.
3545). Therefore, patients with higher socioeconomic status (or higher severity) did not
benefit from reduced waiting times by being able to exercise choice and travelling further.
This further confirms that the enhancement of patient choice did not contribute to the
reduction in waiting time inequalities, and this may be due to the willingness or ability to
travel being driven mostly by quality considerations as opposed to waiting times ones for a
serious cardiovascular condition.
The role of choice may be different for less serious and more standardised procedures such as
cataract and hip replacements, though demand elasticities to waiting times remain low and
around 0.1 (Sivey, 2012, Gutacker et al., 2016, Moscelli et al., 2016). Future work could
adopt our framework to quantify the role of choice in explaining wait inequalities for these
conditions, though we conjecture the role of choice will remain limited due to low demand
elasticities to waiting times. There is an extensive literature which tests if quality affects
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patients choices in the US (Gaynor and Town, 2011), but waiting times are low in the US
(Schoen et al., 2010) and therefore unlikely to affect choice. Our study has implications
mostly for those publicly-funded systems (either NHS or social insurance ones) where i)
waiting times remain long due to restrained public budgets and excess demand, and ii) patient
choice policies are increasingly encouraged and supported by public reporting of quality
indicators (Siciliani, Chalkley and Gravelle, 2017).
Third, we show that waiting time inequalities tend to be larger in both absolute and relative
terms when average waiting times are high. Inequalities reduced when the average waiting
time fell. This suggests that the level of pro-rich inequality in waiting time depends more on
the overall duration of the wait than on the extent of patient choice. As discussed in Section
2, the reduction in average waiting times were obtained by a mix of sustained and unusually
high public health care expenditure growth in England during the 2000s and an aggressive
maximum waiting time target regime, and this fall was not associated with choice reform
from 2006. Our analysis suggests that policies which reduce average waiting times also
reduce inequalities in waiting times. This is consistent with other studies of the pattern of
reduced inequality in the English NHS during the 2000s in the utilisation of health care
(Cookson et al., 2012b, 2013). Waiting times have recently stagnated or started to rise again
due to adverse financial climate and general reduction in public spending. Our analysis
suggests that countries which experience increases in waiting times will also experience
increase in inequalities in waiting times.
Fourth, we have shown that substantial socioeconomic inequalities occur within the same
hospital in the English health system, for patients waiting for effective treatment for a serious
heart condition. Since these inequalities are not primarily due to differences in patient choice
of hospital or procedure, several other mechanisms may explain the presence of a gradient in
waiting times after controlling for selection due to patients choices. One plausible
mechanism is what one might call elbowing behaviour by less deprived patients. More
socioeconomically advantaged patients are likely to be better endowed with information,
networking skills, contacts and consciousness of their rights, enabling them to exercise more
effective pressure to get prioritised for treatment. Moreover, the practice of defensive
medicine by medical staff and hospital management may imply that richer patients are riskier
to disappoint if the health of the patient deteriorates while waiting, and they (or their families)
are more likely to take legal recourse for medical malpractice since they can afford the legal
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expenses for the losing party in a medical malpractice litigation in England (Miller, 1985).
24
Finally, the phenomenon of unconscious bias can occur if doctors are better able to
understand and interpret the health symptoms of patients who are more similar to them in
terms of socioeconomic status.
Future research could explore in greater detail which of these mechanisms is at work to guide
policy developments.
25
Since policy makers in Europe and other OECD countries have
explicit policy goals to ensure equality of access based on need, waiting time inequalities are
cause for concern and need to be addressed. If it is the poor who fall behind because they are
more likely to miss appointments and maintain contact with the hospital, policies that
facilitate access and communication may be appropriate. If it is instead the rich who jump
ahead of the queue, a more robust management of the waiting list is required.
26
24
[..][S]ince British litigants who do not qualify for publicly funded legal services must pay for the assistance
of counsel themselves, financial considerations can be a substantial deterrent to the pursuit of legal remedies. In
addition, a losing party in a lawsuit usually must reimburse the prevailing party's litigation expenses.' In
deciding whether or not to file suit, a potential plaintiff must therefore consider not only his own legal expenses,
but also his opponents' expenses (Miller, 1985; p. 436).
25
Sinko et al. (2015) study waiting time distributions and find that waiting times for less severe patients have
been reducing over-proportionally after the introduction of the maximum waiting time policy in the English
NHS across different specialties. This may be interpreted as a move towards a 'first-come-first-serve
prioritisation rule, and is consistent with the increased equity in waiting times that we have observed towards the
end of our study period. Gutacker et al. (2016) analyse detailed data on patients self-reported pre-operative
health and still find evidence for severity-based prioritisation in elective hip and knee replacement surgery.
26
These policies focus on socioeconomic inequalities which arise within the hospital, which is the focus of our
analysis. This is justified since there are little inequalities in waiting times across hospitals in England for the
treatments considered. Inequalities across hospitals can be important in some health systems such as Australia
(Johar et al., 2013) and could be potentially be addressed by a better allocation of resources. Our study shows
that socioeconomic inequality in waiting time within hospitals can occur also in universal health systems where
allocation of resources between hospitals follows a need based allocation formula.
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Appendix.
Appendix A:
Table A1: Observed waiting times, patients bypassing the closest hospital and distances to closest
hospital, by year and income deprivation quintiles
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
(a) CABG
observed
waiting
times.
EDI Income 1st quint. (Most Deprived) 171.3 111.3 101.1 67.7 68.0 64.5 55.4 47.1 46.5
EDI Income 2nd quint. 157.9 109.7 98.5 65.3 67.7 66.6 58.2 51.2 51.1
EDI Income 3rd quint. 156.3 107.1 101.7 68.9 66.3 62.6 59.6 50.9 52.9
EDI Income 4th quint. 144.5 104.7 97.6 64.0 64.6 66.4 57.7 48.9 50.5
EDI Income 5th quint. (Least Deprived) 134.2 97.5 92.4 60.7 63.2 62.1 58.0 49.5 50.6
(b) PCI
observed
waiting
times.
EDI Income 1st quint. (Most Deprived) 102.3 101.4 89.8 58.6 54.3 45.3 37.2 39.4 40.1
EDI Income 2nd quint. 96.9 99.3 87.7 58.7 53.5 44.5 37.3 41.8 39.7
EDI Income 3rd quint. 90.6 94.7 83.6 57.5 53.2 44.9 39.0 40.6 39.7
EDI Income 4th quint. 81.7 88.4 80.2 54.4 52.9 44.3 37.0 40.3 39.0
EDI Income 5th quint. (Least Deprived) 78.7 81.2 77.2 53.3 48.9 42.5 36.2 38.1 37.9
(c) % CABG
bypassing
closest
hospital.
EDI Income 1st quint. (Most Deprived) 31.8% 35.7% 35.3% 29.2% 28.9% 32.5% 30.0% 30.1% 29.4%
EDI Income 2nd quint. 38.3% 41.8% 41.0% 36.2% 39.8% 36.8% 37.0% 33.2% 32.7%
EDI Income 3rd quint. 36.0% 39.6% 38.7% 34.9% 34.3% 35.9% 32.6% 33.9% 31.2%
EDI Income 4th quint. 35.1% 40.9% 38.1% 35.6% 34.5% 35.7% 36.9% 33.7% 32.3%
EDI Income 5th quint. (Least Deprived) 38.8% 43.8% 41.6% 38.4% 39.2% 39.2% 37.4% 34.1% 30.6%
(d) % PCI
bypassing
closest
hospital.
EDI Income 1st quint. (Most Deprived) 27.9% 29.2% 27.8% 35.5% 40.8% 40.7% 40.5% 33.5% 34.3%
EDI Income 2nd quint. 37.5% 39.0% 37.8% 42.9% 45.0% 44.2% 41.6% 37.0% 36.2%
EDI Income 3rd quint. 36.1% 37.0% 34.2% 39.0% 43.9% 40.8% 39.9% 35.7% 36.7%
EDI Income 4th quint. 35.5% 37.1% 34.4% 41.0% 44.1% 40.4% 41.6% 35.2% 36.4%
EDI Income 5th quint. (Least Deprived) 39.5% 41.0% 37.3% 43.7% 46.2% 42.7% 39.4% 36.7% 37.3%
(e) distance
to closest
CABG
hospital.
EDI Income 1st quint. (Most Deprived) 17.6 17.2 16.9 18.5 18.4 17.6 17.8 18.3 17.7
EDI Income 2nd quint. 23.7 24.8 25.7 26.0 26.2 24.3 23.8 23.2 23.3
EDI Income 3rd quint. 28.3 27.8 30.1 30.4 32.1 29.0 28.3 29.8 27.9
EDI Income 4th quint. 28.8 29.8 29.8 30.8 31.4 29.6 28.5 29.8 28.1
EDI Income 5th quint. (Least Deprived) 26.4 26.3 26.3 27.2 27.9 25.2 26.1 26.6 26.0
(f) distance
to closest
PCI hospital.
EDI Income 1st quint. (Most Deprived) 15.3 14.9 14.7 12.9 12.0 11.3 10.7 10.6 9.7
EDI Income 2nd quint. 22.2 21.7 20.8 18.4 15.7 14.9 13.6 13.6 12.9
EDI Income 3rd quint. 24.9 26.2 25.2 23.1 18.4 18.1 16.1 15.3 14.8
EDI Income 4th quint. 27.0 27.2 26.9 23.3 19.6 18.1 16.6 16.5 15.9
EDI Income 5th quint. (Least Deprived) 23.0 22.8 23.5 21.2 18.8 17.3 15.7 16.1 15.2
J¨
distance
(2nd - 1st)
closest
CABG hosp.
EDI Income 1st quint. (Most Deprived) 20.2 17.9 18.1 19.6 20.4 21.1 22.4 21.4 21.2
EDI Income 2nd quint. 20.6 18.4 20.2 20.3 20.9 22.5 23.2 23.6 23.5
EDI Income 3rd quint. 23.5 21.5 23.5 25.4 25.4 26.1 26.7 25.6 26.1
EDI Income 4th quint. 23.2 21.3 22.8 22.2 24.4 24.4 24.8 25.4 25.5
EDI Income 5th quint. (Least Deprived) 19.4 17.3 19.7 20.5 20.5 22.4 21.2 23.1 25.1
K¨
distance
(2nd - 1st)
closest PCI
hospital.
EDI Income 1st quint. (Most Deprived) 18.7 18.3 17.7 16.6 15.5 14.7 11.4 12.9 11.3
EDI Income 2nd quint. 17.0 16.8 17.0 16.3 15.0 15.1 13.3 13.3 12.4
EDI Income 3rd quint. 19.7 19.5 19.7 18.8 18.4 18.2 15.5 15.6 14.7
EDI Income 4th quint. 20.0 19.9 19.6 18.2 17.3 16.9 14.7 15.9 14.4
EDI Income 5th quint. (Least Deprived) 19.0 18.5 18.4 16.3 14.4 14.1 12.5 13.0 11.6
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Appendix B: Chow F-test for switching regimes
Table B1: Chow F-test for switching regimes.
CHOW test on Procedures (a)
Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Chow F-stat value 34.557 19.704 14.357 14.584 16.588 27.703 27.063 12.416 11.108
F-stat 90% C.L. 1.216 1.205 1.205 1.198 1.189 1.183 1.176 1.174 1.170
F-stat 95% C.L. 1.285 1.270 1.270 1.261 1.249 1.240 1.231 1.229 1.223
F-stat 99% C.L. 1.422 1.399 1.399 1.384 1.367 1.353 1.339 1.336 1.327
CHOW test on Closest Hospital Bypassing - CABG sample (b)
Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Chow F-stat value 3.432 2.339 2.326 1.278 1.756 1.668 1.466 1.385 1.197
F-stat 90% C.L. 1.228 1.223 1.224 1.228 1.228 1.226 1.224 1.228 1.228
F-stat 95% C.L. 1.301 1.294 1.297 1.301 1.301 1.299 1.297 1.302 1.302
F-stat 99% C.L. 1.447 1.436 1.440 1.447 1.447 1.444 1.440 1.448 1.448
CHOW test on Closest Hospital Bypassing - PCI sample (c)
Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Chow F-stat value 3.237 3.776 2.754 3.252 2.403 3.115 2.457 2.545 1.703
F-stat 90% C.L. 1.219 1.212 1.209 1.199 1.190 1.185 1.178 1.176 1.171
F-stat 95% C.L. 1.290 1.280 1.276 1.262 1.251 1.243 1.235 1.231 1.224
F-stat 99% C.L. 1.430 1.414 1.408 1.387 1.369 1.357 1.345 1.340 1.329
In each year, the Chow F-test rejects the hypothesis of the conditional waiting times for the
two revascularisation procedures coming from the same data generating process at 99%
confidence level. The test also rejects the hypothesis of conditional waiting times for each
procedure coming from the exact same process for people treated or not at their closest
hospital site, at 99% confidence level for PCI and at least 95% confidence level for CABG
(excluding the last year of the sample). These results support the use of switching regression
models as the correct empirical specification for our analysis.
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Appendix C: Propensity score by self-selection status.
Figure C1: Propensity score by self-selection status.
(a) CABG patients - Year 2002/03 - Hospital bypassing (b) CABG patients - Year 2010/11 - Hospital bypassing
(c) PCI patients - Year 2002/03 - Hospital bypassing (d) PCI patients - Year 2010/11 - Hospital bypassing
(e) All patients - Year 2002/03 - procedure choice (f) All patients - Year 2010/11 - procedure choice
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In Figure C1 we plot a graphical representation of the estimated parametric propensity score
computed in financial years 2002/03 and 2010/11, based on the observable covariates
included in the model. The top two graphs in Figure C1 show the propensity score frequency
in the CABG sample based on the estimates of Eq.(3), the middle ones show the propensity
score frequency in the PCI sample based on the estimates of Eq.(3) and the bottom ones the
propensity score frequency in the pooled CABG and PCI patients sample based on the
estimates of Eq.(3).
The plots show the validity of the common support assumption in our models. If patients in
the different selection regimes were so different to the point of not being comparable, then
the plots in Figure C1 would show a complete lack of overlap of the frequencies of the
estimated propensity score by bandwidth (vertical axis). The overlap of the distributions
instead is evident. The specification of the first stage probit seems to be capturing adequately
the common underlying risk factors behind the self-selection choices and the estimated
propensity score for the two treatment subgroups in each plots lies roughly in the same
domain (horizontal axis). Hence, the sub-populations of treated patients are still comparable
and not too heterogeneous on their observable health risk profiles, when they are split by self-
selection regime.
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Appendix D: Self-selection model with joint choice of procedure and
bypassing of the closest hospital
In Table D1 we show the results for a Roy model for the joint choice of selection into
procedure and selection of bypassing the closest hospital. The selection correction is
computed parametrically and based on the modification of the Dubin and McFadden (1984)
multinomial logit selection correction proposed by Bourguignon et al. (2007). With this
method, there are as many selection correction terms as the switching regimes, which are four
in our case: two for the choice of closest hospital bypassing and two for choice of procedure.
Both exclusion restrictions based on distance are used in the first step multinomial logit
regression.
Results. The estimation of the joint model for selection of hospital bypassing and procedure
suggests very similar results to those in Table 5 and Table 6. A positive and statistically
significant socio-economic gradient is found in each year for CABG patients choosing the
closest hospital, as well as for both categories of PCI patients. The estimates of the gradient
for CABG patients bypassing the closest hospital show a more erratic behaviour, and are
significant for most but not all the years. It is likely that the estimation is fuzzier in this case,
as this is also the category with the smallest sample size. However, the results for the
remaining three categories clearly show a statistically significant but decreasing socio-
economic gradient in waiting time due to income deprivation. The estimated coefficients are
larger and always significant in the most income deprived group, for both CABG and PCI
patients choosing the closest hospitals. Hence, this confirms that most of the more income-
deprived patients needing cardiac revascularisation have been subject to waiting time
inequalities due to SES in the English NHS between 2002 and 2010.
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Table D1: Roy model with joint correction for choice of bypassing the closest hospital and procedure.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
CABG patients  bypassing the closest hospital
EDI income 1st quintile 0.1299* 0.2387*** 0.2063*** 0.0622 0.1413*** 0.1615*** 0.0655 0.0795 0.0353
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.0790 0.1950*** 0.0831* 0.0668* 0.1379*** 0.1755*** 0.0261 0.1040** 0.1417**
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.0168 0.0845* 0.1577*** 0.0674 0.0673 0.1057*** 0.1113** 0.0703 0.0235
EDI income 4th quintile -0.0239 0.0759 0.0348 0.0133 0.0092 0.1384*** 0.0815 0.0235 0.0467
Selection correction 1 0.1435 -0.1877* -0.5304*** -0.1159 0.0304 -0.0157 -0.9992*** -0.1767 -0.1528
Selection correction 2 1.4671** -0.2402 -1.6556*** -0.9507** -0.3961 0.0602 -1.3930*** -0.5345 -0.2145
Selection correction 3 1.5134** 0.0629 -0.8693 -0.2172 -0.3878 -0.0589 1.4203** -0.3329 0.1872
Selection correction 4 1.3843 0.4407 -0.6518 -0.0103 -0.0606 -0.1390 -0.7395 -0.7689 -1.2848**
Constant 5.6196*** 4.3065*** 3.7506*** 3.5749*** 3.4398*** 3.5693*** 4.7056*** 3.1947*** 3.1095***
CABG patients  choosing the closest hospital
EDI income 1st quintile 0.3231*** 0.2423*** 0.1447*** 0.1553*** 0.1559*** 0.1116*** 0.1216*** 0.0673** 0.0915**
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2398*** 0.1653*** 0.1143*** 0.1242*** 0.1524*** 0.1448*** 0.1099*** 0.0716** 0.0556
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1948*** 0.0994** 0.1401*** 0.1094*** 0.0894*** 0.0405 0.0789** 0.0040 0.0718**
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0269 0.0683* 0.0763** 0.0746** 0.0435 0.0693** 0.0419 -0.0025 0.0290
Selection correction 1 0.4425** -0.1876 0.2403 0.3175 -0.2225 -0.3966 0.0094 -0.2023 -0.0819
Selection correction 2 0.2123 -0.3353* -0.2835 -0.1094 -0.2841* -0.2369** 0.3056* 0.0511 0.1948*
Selection correction 3 0.9843** 0.5516 0.6292 0.3296 -0.0895 0.4122 -0.0133 -0.0504 -0.2675
Selection correction 4 1.2962** 1.0995* 1.4148** 0.7802 0.2199 0.6098** -0.4410 -0.2979 -0.5977*
Constant 4.8880*** 5.1171*** 5.2154*** 4.2758*** 4.0679*** 4.2878*** 3.1040*** 3.1771*** 2.8286***
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PCI patients  bypassing the closest hospital
EDI income 1st quintile 0.3005*** 0.2947*** 0.1851*** 0.1409*** 0.1219*** 0.2022*** 0.1729*** 0.1434*** 0.1411***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2632*** 0.2754*** 0.1866*** 0.1502*** 0.1337*** 0.1551*** 0.1327*** 0.1631*** 0.1055***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1904*** 0.1731*** 0.0875** 0.1173*** 0.0938*** 0.1491*** 0.1468*** 0.1309*** 0.0780***
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0366 0.1146** -0.0051 0.0474 0.0633** 0.1074*** 0.0885*** 0.0990*** 0.0706**
Selection correction 1 -0.4432 -1.7725** 0.7086 0.7006 -0.9006 0.8850 -1.6384*** -0.6523 -0.6232
Selection correction 2 -1.4632 -1.0162 -0.6435 -0.0597 -1.2222** 0.4955 0.0408 -0.1519 0.1458
Selection correction 3 0.1203 0.4246*** -0.1077 0.0043 -0.0671 -0.0993 0.1486** -0.2483*** -0.0698
Selection correction 4 0.5363 1.4040** 0.1466 0.2880 -0.6262* -0.1983 -0.3049 -1.0517*** -0.3934
Constant 3.0727*** 3.1742*** 4.0644*** 3.7554*** 2.8033*** 3.5259*** 2.6148*** 2.8115*** 3.0442***
PCI patients  choosing the closest hospital
EDI income 1st quintile 0.3513*** 0.3094*** 0.2421*** 0.1750*** 0.1948*** 0.1462*** 0.0876*** 0.1052*** 0.1327***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2932*** 0.2199*** 0.1972*** 0.1600*** 0.1837*** 0.0923*** 0.0654*** 0.0943*** 0.1175***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2038*** 0.1413*** 0.1276*** 0.1155*** 0.1428*** 0.0436* 0.0789*** 0.0712*** 0.1030***
EDI income 4th quintile 0.1021** 0.1034*** 0.0769*** 0.0233 0.0711*** 0.0360 0.0423** 0.0329 0.0343
Selection correction 1 -0.1947 -0.2666 -0.3714 -0.4835** -0.4667 -0.9468** -0.1649 -0.0197 -0.4650*
Selection correction 2 -0.6268 -1.2616*** -1.3795*** -0.3843 0.1909 -0.6834* -0.8073** -0.4645 0.0988
Selection correction 3 0.4207 0.4263 -0.1828 -0.1140 0.1630 0.4140** -0.1878 -0.3433** -0.3266**
Selection correction 4 0.4816 0.4529** 0.0691 -0.1169 -0.1133 0.1804 -0.0244 -0.1742 -0.3293***
Constant 3.2925*** 3.1745*** 3.3433*** 3.4709*** 3.6752*** 2.8312*** 2.8950*** 3.0352*** 3.2928***
Notes. Roy model on joint cardiac revascularisation procedures (CABG and PCI) sample based on multinomial logit selection correction. Exclusion
restrictions in the 1
st
stage regression: a) differential distance between second and first hospital site (by procedure); b) (average) distance between the first
three hospitals providing CABG and the first three ones providing PCI. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, admission month, Charlson comorbidities
dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization in the previous year, hospital fixed effects (except for 1
st
stage multinomial logit
regression). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Appendix E: Fixed effects quantile regressions.
We estimate quantile regression models accounting for hospital fixed effects to test how the
gradient differs at different points of the waiting time distribution. Hospital fixed effects are
introduced following the method proposed by Canay (2011). Provided that is a pure
location shift of the conditional quantile function, the parameters of interest can be
consistently identified by running a quantile regression of the difference between the
individual outcome and the fixed effects ( ) on the usual covariate set. The
outcome equation for the conditional quantile ( ) is given by
(7)
The estimated waiting times by waiting times quantile are computed as
.
Figure E 1 shows the estimated waiting times for the first, third and fifth SES quintile groups,
at the 25
th
and 75
th
quantiles of the waiting times distribution (the full results for quantile
regressions are provided in Tables E 1 and E 2). Socioeconomic inequalities are found both
when the waiting times are short (25
th
quantile) or long (75
th
quantile). Hence, inequalities
affected the entire waiting time distribution and were not confined to hospitals with either
relatively short or long waiting times.
A larger relative socioeconomic gradient in waiting times is found at lower conditional
waiting times (25
th
quantile), for both CABG and PCI patients, across all years. This pattern
is consistent with severely ill patients, who have a relatively short expected waiting time but a
larger risk of dying while waiting, having a greater incentive to play the system than those in
less severe conditions. In line with previous results, the relative income gradient decreases
almost monotonically over time.
Quantile regressions results show that inequalities are pervasive and present across the
waiting time distribution.
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Table E1: Quantile Regression with hospital fixed effects (Equation (7)). Income inequalities in waiting times. CABG patients.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Q10
EDI income 1st quintile 0.4781*** 0.3623*** 0.1852** 0.2308*** 0.1857** 0.2108** 0.1797** 0.1173* 0.1224
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.3441*** 0.2063** 0.1333 0.3140*** 0.2455** 0.3423*** 0.1507* 0.1380* 0.0968
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1438 0.1042 0.3044*** 0.2311*** 0.1746* 0.2012** 0.1857** 0.0525 0.0831
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0392 0.0204 0.0742 0.1675** 0.0227 0.2250*** 0.1355* 0.1347** 0.0665
Constant 2.6351*** 2.7324*** 2.4530*** 2.2791*** 2.4700*** 2.5190*** 2.5164*** 2.2392*** 2.1420***
Q25
EDI income 1st quintile 0.4076*** 0.2912*** 0.2459*** 0.1217*** 0.1500*** 0.1073** 0.1029** 0.0274 0.0860*
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2803*** 0.2719*** 0.1611*** 0.1403*** 0.1658*** 0.2006*** 0.0201 0.0964** 0.0801*
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2522*** 0.1281** 0.2197*** 0.1473*** 0.1407*** 0.0958** 0.0925** 0.0676 0.1162***
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0645 0.1213** 0.1196** 0.1193** 0.0463 0.1552*** 0.0445 0.0054 0.0747*
Constant 3.6949*** 3.6300*** 3.6097*** 3.3185*** 3.4895*** 3.4133*** 3.2577*** 3.0262*** 2.9401***
Q50
EDI income 1st quintile 0.3345*** 0.1708*** 0.1266*** 0.0981*** 0.0909*** 0.0547*** 0.0417* 0.0500* 0.0348
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2652*** 0.1521*** 0.0754** 0.0649*** 0.0902*** 0.0586*** 0.0473** 0.0400 0.0556*
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1997*** 0.0900*** 0.0758*** 0.0503*** 0.0537*** 0.0145 0.0157 0.0177 0.0717**
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0776** 0.0831*** 0.0688*** 0.0220 0.0123 0.0097 0.0121 -0.0058 0.0449
Constant 4.4834*** 4.2945*** 4.3179*** 3.9716*** 3.9942*** 3.8896*** 3.7613*** 3.6483*** 3.6208***
Q75
EDI income 1st quintile 0.1666*** 0.1572*** 0.1038*** 0.1110*** 0.0733*** 0.0914*** 0.0478** 0.0699*** 0.0611**
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.1154*** 0.1267*** 0.0583*** 0.0722*** 0.0678*** 0.0676*** 0.0580*** 0.0713*** 0.0764***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.0943*** 0.0758*** 0.0417** 0.0536*** 0.0123 0.0025 -0.0035 -0.0064 0.0165
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0158 0.0513** 0.0130 0.0115 0.0007 0.0188 0.0009 -0.0169 0.0206
Constant 5.0263*** 4.7974*** 4.8169*** 4.2386*** 4.2504*** 4.2022*** 4.1475*** 4.1075*** 4.0677***
Q90
EDI income 1st quintile 0.1246*** 0.1572*** 0.1269*** 0.2071*** 0.1492*** 0.1270*** 0.0634** 0.1068*** 0.0931**
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.0673** 0.0826*** 0.0832*** 0.0963*** 0.0672** 0.1195*** 0.0547** 0.0808*** 0.0730**
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.0729*** 0.0235 0.0261 0.1418*** 0.0097 0.0181 -0.0061 0.0186 -0.0086
EDI income 4th quintile -0.0398 0.0064 0.0114 0.0423 0.0064 0.0492* -0.0252 -0.0341 -0.0359
Constant 5.4508*** 5.2016*** 5.1144*** 4.4868*** 4.5393*** 4.5039*** 4.4267*** 4.3707*** 4.4607***
Patients 14654 14213 14074 12060 11536 12218 11829 10000 8888
Notes. Sample: CABG patients only. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past
utilization in the previous year, hospital fixed effects. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table E2: Quantile Regression with hospital fixed effects (Equation (7)). Income inequalities in waiting times. PCI patients.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Q10
EDI income 1st quintile 0.5347*** 0.6444*** 0.4813*** 0.3905*** 0.4859*** 0.4600*** 0.2968*** 0.3182*** 0.3839***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.4944*** 0.5205*** 0.4590*** 0.4294*** 0.4193*** 0.3107*** 0.2569*** 0.2808*** 0.3241***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.3526*** 0.2711*** 0.2661*** 0.2765*** 0.3062*** 0.2480*** 0.2604*** 0.2150*** 0.2933***
EDI income 4th quintile 0.1697*** 0.1847*** 0.1071* 0.0948* 0.1548*** 0.1789*** 0.1513*** 0.1225** 0.1468***
Constant 2.2762*** 2.1458*** 2.6752*** 2.4491*** 2.3963*** 1.9818*** 2.1178*** 2.0808*** 2.0726***
Q25
EDI income 1st quintile 0.5478*** 0.4538*** 0.3173*** 0.2200*** 0.2393*** 0.1999*** 0.1251*** 0.1640*** 0.1394***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.4572*** 0.3758*** 0.2781*** 0.1969*** 0.2126*** 0.1406*** 0.1156*** 0.1771*** 0.1437***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2863*** 0.2468*** 0.1435*** 0.1612*** 0.1671*** 0.1349*** 0.1197*** 0.1322*** 0.1216***
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0950* 0.1418*** 0.1018*** 0.0475 0.0994*** 0.1159*** 0.0722*** 0.0731*** 0.0756***
Constant 3.1844*** 3.3229*** 3.5771*** 3.2415*** 3.2364*** 2.8132*** 2.8449*** 2.8313*** 2.8654***
Q50
EDI income 1st quintile 0.4000*** 0.2463*** 0.1590*** 0.0902*** 0.0993*** 0.0637*** 0.0575*** 0.0667*** 0.0762***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.3139*** 0.2306*** 0.1374*** 0.0882*** 0.0977*** 0.0580*** 0.0590*** 0.0527*** 0.0706***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1906*** 0.1495*** 0.0633*** 0.0762*** 0.0585*** 0.0616*** 0.0710*** 0.0507*** 0.0624***
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0580* 0.1045*** 0.0477** 0.0155 0.0382*** 0.0446*** 0.0367** 0.0239 0.0427***
Constant 4.0244*** 4.2324*** 4.1930*** 3.8407*** 3.7552*** 3.4175*** 3.3684*** 3.3757*** 3.3635***
Q75
EDI income 1st quintile 0.2892*** 0.1276*** 0.0786*** 0.0560*** 0.0475*** 0.0433*** 0.0336** 0.0429*** 0.0331**
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2042*** 0.1341*** 0.0629*** 0.0592*** 0.0642*** 0.0433*** 0.0300** 0.0398*** 0.0444***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1620*** 0.0748*** 0.0238 0.0477*** 0.0346*** 0.0194 0.0302** 0.0313** 0.0353***
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0418 0.0504*** -0.0057 0.0095 0.0180 0.0181 0.0139 0.0192 0.0136
Constant 4.6330*** 4.7744*** 4.6121*** 4.1564*** 4.1107*** 3.8019*** 3.7545*** 3.7348*** 3.7794***
Q90
EDI income 1st quintile 0.2444*** 0.1234*** 0.0630*** 0.0330** 0.0417*** 0.0212 0.0190 0.0263 0.0100
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.1551*** 0.0939*** 0.0611*** 0.0401*** 0.0645*** 0.0211 0.0277 0.0313* 0.0300
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1178*** 0.0352 0.0184 0.0106 0.0480*** -0.0083 0.0167 0.0252 0.0116
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0346 0.0021 -0.0075 -0.0168 0.0272** -0.0109 0.0029 0.0107 -0.0163
Constant 5.0896*** 5.1053*** 4.9312*** 4.3945*** 4.3773*** 4.1261*** 4.0557*** 4.0240*** 4.0714***
Patients 16095 20140 24355 25632 26772 25545 25399 23861 23759
Notes. Sample: PCI patients only. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past
utilization in the previous year, hospital fixed effects. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Appendix F: Robustness checks on Roy Model on closest hospital bypassing.
Table F1. Roy model. Income inequalities in CABG waiting times, with selection of hospital based on distance, quality and waiting times
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Patients not choosing the closest CABG hospital site  Equation (4)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.1599*** 0.2297*** 0.2269*** 0.0821* 0.1427*** 0.1516*** 0.0183 0.0952** 0.0657
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.1082** 0.1919*** 0.0858* 0.0796** 0.1351*** 0.1723*** 0.0150 0.1087** 0.1577***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.0462 0.0944* 0.1560*** 0.0716* 0.0689 0.0739* 0.0656 0.0720 0.0232
EDI income 4th quintile -0.0060 0.0773 0.0383 0.0273 0.0104 0.0923** 0.0140 0.0261 0.0488
IMR1 - Not closest 0.0676 0.2534*** 0.2603*** 0.0116 -0.0463 0.0880** 0.1386*** 0.0217 -0.0674
Constant 4.3409*** 4.2039*** 4.3749*** 3.7719*** 3.7315*** 3.7080*** 3.6457*** 3.5746*** 3.3679***
Patients choosing the closest CABG hospital site  Equation (5)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.3657*** 0.2529*** 0.1476*** 0.1678*** 0.1759*** 0.1150*** 0.1100*** 0.0689** 0.1019***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2710*** 0.1859*** 0.1166*** 0.1401*** 0.1523*** 0.1522*** 0.0985*** 0.0708** 0.0607*
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2168*** 0.1051*** 0.1290*** 0.1168*** 0.0932*** 0.0514 0.0683** 0.0057 0.0850**
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0423 0.0566 0.0694** 0.0880*** 0.0512 0.0781** 0.0433 -0.0010 0.0268
IMR0  Closest -0.0273 -0.0237 -0.0919** -0.0237 0.0270 -0.0195 0.0426 -0.0043 0.0692*
Constant 4.1944*** 4.2033*** 4.0651*** 3.6272*** 3.7028*** 3.7162*** 3.6197*** 3.4278*** 3.4190***
1st Stage Probit for Choice of provider by distance: CLOSEST vs NOT CLOSEST hospital - only CABG  Equation (3)
Distance difference 2nd - 1st provider -0.0351*** -0.0183*** -0.0202*** -0.0318*** -0.0367*** -0.0320*** -0.0299*** -0.0318*** -0.0385***οݍ (difference in CABG mortality
rates)
0.0268 0.0280** 0.0357*** 0.1075*** -0.0346** -0.0517*** -0.1481*** -0.1537*** -0.2211***οݓ (difference in CABG long waits) -1.0344*** -0.4551*** -0.8113*** -0.7125*** 0.0482 -0.4762*** -0.0667 0.8455*** 1.2529***
Specialist closest hospital 0.0287 -0.1089** -0.1395*** -0.0652 -0.0140 -0.1033 -0.1518** -0.0242 -0.1847**
EDI income 1st quintile -0.1875*** -0.1483*** -0.1890*** -0.2837*** -0.3223*** -0.2513*** -0.2956*** -0.2382*** -0.2218***
EDI income 2nd quintile -0.0229 0.0110 -0.0132 -0.0948** -0.0142 -0.1419*** -0.0584 -0.0815* -0.0425
EDI income 3rd quintile -0.0257 -0.0260 -0.0189 -0.0253 -0.0807** -0.0956** -0.1003** -0.0030 -0.0288
EDI income 4th quintile -0.0355 0.0048 -0.0417 -0.0486 -0.0664 -0.1320*** 0.0097 0.0151 0.0341
Constant 0.2815*** 0.0264 0.0895 0.2007*** 0.2780*** 0.1744*** 0.1050 0.1946*** 0.3120***
Patients 14654 13678 14074 12060 11536 11245 11635 10000 8888
Chi-squared p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R^2 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.20
Notes. Sample: CABG patients only. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization
in the previous year, hospital fixed effects (in Eq.(4) and (5) only). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
53
Table F2. Roy model. Income inequalities in PCI waiting times, with selection of hospital based on distance, quality and waiting times
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Patients not choosing the closest PCI hospital site  Equation (4)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.4109*** 0.2626*** 0.2011*** 0.1527*** 0.1303*** 0.2050*** 0.1225*** 0.1496*** 0.1245***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.3289*** 0.2338*** 0.2118*** 0.1664*** 0.1066*** 0.1604*** 0.1404*** 0.1592*** 0.1038***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2501*** 0.1143** 0.1198*** 0.1270*** 0.0984*** 0.1425*** 0.1130*** 0.1212*** 0.0701**
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0616 0.0767* 0.0161 0.0707** 0.0652** 0.1171*** 0.0358 0.0967*** 0.0565*
IMR1 - Not closest -0.0855* -0.0408 -0.0302 -0.0341 -0.0126 -0.0521 -0.0226 0.0451 -0.0076
Constant 3.5364*** 3.8925*** 3.8744*** 3.3853*** 3.5481*** 3.1311*** 3.1944*** 3.2669*** 3.2044***
Patients choosing the closest PCI hospital site  Equation (5)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.4365*** 0.3239*** 0.2519*** 0.1862*** 0.1880*** 0.1345*** 0.1047*** 0.1054*** 0.1386***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.3466*** 0.2400*** 0.2022*** 0.1837*** 0.1864*** 0.1036*** 0.0755*** 0.0872*** 0.1235***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2410*** 0.1470*** 0.1207*** 0.1326*** 0.1327*** 0.0519** 0.0880*** 0.0668*** 0.1086***
EDI income 4th quintile 0.1327*** 0.0924*** 0.0808*** 0.0342 0.0709*** 0.0276 0.0375* 0.0296 0.0353*
IMR0  Closest 0.1191*** 0.0223 -0.0040 -0.0152 -0.0408* 0.0049 -0.0038 0.0257 0.0241
Constant 3.8224*** 3.9053*** 3.9699*** 3.6210*** 3.5696*** 3.2635*** 3.2400*** 3.1571*** 3.2163***
1st Stage Probit for Choice of provider by distance: CLOSEST vs NOT CLOSEST hospital - only PCI  Equation (3)
Distance difference 2nd - 1st provider -0.0374*** -0.0416*** -0.0420*** -0.0512*** -0.0477*** -0.0195*** -0.0322*** -0.0412*** -0.0450***οݍ (difference in PCI mortality rates) 0.0473* 0.2004*** 0.6574*** -0.2752*** -0.1853*** 0.5335*** 0.0298* 0.1716*** 0.6811***οݓ (difference in PCI long waits) -0.8491*** -0.6840*** -0.1305*** 0.1888*** 1.0622*** 0.5846*** -0.2134*** 0.2489*** 1.0689***
Specialist closest hospital 0.0150 0.0285 0.0464 0.0996* -0.4429*** -0.4665*** -1.0110*** -0.8188*** -0.3209***
EDI income 1st quintile -0.4033*** -0.2966*** -0.3241*** -0.3528*** -0.1135*** -0.0472 -0.0022 -0.1492*** -0.1918***
EDI income 2nd quintile -0.1345*** -0.0940*** -0.0460 -0.0747** -0.0335 0.0637** 0.1000*** -0.0145 -0.1131***
EDI income 3rd quintile -0.1082*** -0.0341 -0.0540* -0.0824** -0.0008 0.0810*** 0.0770*** 0.0206 -0.0101
EDI income 4th quintile -0.1433*** -0.0231 -0.0457 -0.0092 -0.0353 0.0428 0.0932*** 0.0208 0.0178
Constant 0.2801*** 0.2235*** 0.2040*** 0.2473*** 0.3624*** -0.0829* 0.0004 0.0594 0.1675***
Patients 15600 18413 23668 20524 23470 21814 22767 22609 22196
Chi-squared p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R^2 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.14
Notes. Sample: PCI patients only. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization in
the previous year, hospital fixed effects (in Eq.(4) and (5) only). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Appendix G: Robustness checks on Roy model with selection on heart revascularization procedure.
Table G1. Roy Model estimates with selection of procedure, including interactions of SES indicators with comorbidities and past emergency admissions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Patients choosing CABG  Equation (4)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.3700*** 0.2246*** 0.1630*** 0.1352*** 0.1582*** 0.1263*** 0.0695*** 0.0785*** 0.0953***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2615*** 0.1724*** 0.1034*** 0.1160*** 0.1443*** 0.1621*** 0.0676*** 0.0814*** 0.0938***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1929*** 0.0898*** 0.1408*** 0.0989*** 0.0867*** 0.0717*** 0.0479** 0.0268 0.0691**
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0477 0.0656** 0.0595** 0.0642** 0.0334 0.0949*** 0.0243 0.0082 0.0292
IMR1 - CABG -0.6570** 0.6399** 0.5899*** -0.0316 0.2994 0.0443 -0.1516 0.0696 0.1594
Constant 3.8657*** 4.5790*** 4.2556*** 3.6980*** 4.1648*** 3.9892*** 3.2212*** 3.1647*** 3.3939***
Patients choosing PCI  Equation (5)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.4928*** 0.3122*** 0.2289*** 0.1675*** 0.1672*** 0.1664*** 0.1096*** 0.1207*** 0.1391***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.3893*** 0.2585*** 0.1982*** 0.1643*** 0.1633*** 0.1185*** 0.0987*** 0.1208*** 0.1221***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2743*** 0.1566*** 0.1119*** 0.1201*** 0.1181*** 0.0896*** 0.0987*** 0.0895*** 0.0924***
EDI income 4th quintile 0.1328*** 0.0988*** 0.0502** 0.0420** 0.0667*** 0.0674*** 0.0497*** 0.0548*** 0.0524***
IMR0 - PCI -0.6769* 0.4395 0.1547 -0.2085 0.1113 0.2402 -0.2050 -0.3411** -0.3898***
Constant 4.1241*** 3.6822*** 3.9812*** 3.7254*** 3.4458*** 2.9850*** 3.5187*** 3.3813*** 3.3805***
1st Stage Probit for Choice of procedure: CABG vs PCI  Equation (3), including (past admissions, co-morbidities) * SES interactions
Differential distance of first 3 hospitals by procedure -0.0016*** 0.0001 -0.0013*** -0.0008** -0.0004 0.0009*** -0.0003 -0.0008** -0.0020***
EDI income 1st quintile 0.1829*** 0.0212 -0.0019 0.0630** 0.0333 0.0171 0.0111 0.0473* 0.0232
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.1234*** 0.0217 -0.0337 0.0693*** 0.0000 0.0262 0.0388 0.0390 0.0213
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1006*** -0.0065 -0.0487** 0.0345 -0.0291 0.0245 0.0047 0.0456* -0.0362
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0738*** -0.0174 -0.0403* 0.0631** 0.0141 0.0103 -0.0314 0.0031 0.0522*
Number of comorbidities (N.C.) 0.1112*** 0.1044*** 0.1116*** 0.1245*** 0.1424*** 0.1496*** 0.1659*** 0.1693*** 0.1941***
EDI income 1st quintile * N.C. 0.0205* 0.0068 -0.0075 -0.0202** -0.0238*** -0.0213** -0.0062 -0.0167* -0.0385***
EDI income 2nd quintile * N.C. 0.0067 0.0143 0.0043 -0.0224** -0.0112 -0.0129 -0.0136 -0.0065 -0.0172*
EDI income 3rd quintile * N.C. 0.0165 0.0001 0.0185** -0.0134 0.0034 -0.0013 -0.0056 -0.0055 -0.0078
EDI income 4th quintile * N.C. -0.0020 0.0081 0.0134 0.0067 -0.0002 -0.0013 -0.0120 -0.0035 0.0023
Number of past year emergency admissions (N.P.A.) -0.1417*** -0.1405*** -0.1884*** -0.0939*** -0.1324*** -0.1072*** -0.1250*** -0.0657** -0.1710***
EDI income 1st quintile * N.P.A. -0.0025 -0.0024 0.0869*** -0.0378 0.0082 -0.0287 -0.0371 -0.1140*** -0.0162
EDI income 2nd quintile * N.P.A. 0.0128 0.0358 0.1097*** 0.0059 0.0254 -0.0278 -0.0201 -0.0676* -0.0161
EDI income 3rd quintile * N.P.A. -0.0293 0.0345 0.0885** 0.0209 0.0321 -0.0028 -0.0172 -0.1165*** 0.0179
EDI income 4th quintile * N.P.A. -0.0306 -0.0103 0.0693** -0.0262 -0.0436 -0.0529 0.0179 -0.0048 -0.0824**
Constant -0.0760** -0.1647*** -0.2912*** -0.4942*** -0.4229*** -0.3062*** -0.3803*** -0.4830*** -0.5787***
Patients 30749 34353 38429 37692 38308 37763 37228 33861 32647
Chi^2 p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R^2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.13
Notes. Sample: CABG and PCI patients. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past
utilization in the previous year, hospital fixed effects (in Eq.(4) and (5) only). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table G2. Roy Model estimates with selection of procedure, including differential Length of Stay and interactions of Length of Stay with SES indicators.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Patients choosing CABG  Equation (4)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.3205*** 0.2336*** 0.1647*** 0.1350*** 0.1536*** 0.1261*** 0.0661** 0.0784*** 0.0928***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2294*** 0.1752*** 0.1029*** 0.1165*** 0.1420*** 0.1630*** 0.0705*** 0.0810*** 0.0925***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1681*** 0.0905*** 0.1398*** 0.0992*** 0.0871*** 0.0737*** 0.0469* 0.0267 0.0679**
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0323 0.0677** 0.0585** 0.0647** 0.0338 0.0943*** 0.0193 0.0081 0.0300
IMR1 - CABG -0.2822 0.6291** 0.4279* -0.0481 0.3363 -0.0887 -0.3686** 0.1015 0.1415
Constant 4.1918*** 4.5481*** 4.0854*** 3.6809*** 4.2090*** 3.8500*** 2.9991*** 3.2006*** 3.3729***
Patients choosing PCI  Equation (5)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.4683*** 0.3166*** 0.2305*** 0.1648*** 0.1671*** 0.1669*** 0.1093*** 0.1183*** 0.1362***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.3734*** 0.2589*** 0.1980*** 0.1615*** 0.1633*** 0.1199*** 0.0961*** 0.1213*** 0.1214***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2652*** 0.1572*** 0.1102*** 0.1185*** 0.1180*** 0.0914*** 0.0984*** 0.0895*** 0.0904***
EDI income 4th quintile 0.1245*** 0.0986*** 0.0487** 0.0401** 0.0666*** 0.0671*** 0.0511*** 0.0545*** 0.0543***
IMR0 - PCI -0.5246** 0.4311 0.0046 -0.1432 0.1239 0.0965 -0.0627 -0.5403*** -0.5110***
Constant 4.0248*** 3.6747*** 4.0732*** 3.6952*** 3.4396*** 3.0741*** 3.4367*** 3.4918*** 3.4448***
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EDI income 1st quintile 1.1201*** 0.1568 0.4020* -0.7123** -0.1391 -1.3146*** -1.5008*** 0.5644 0.0817
EDI income 2nd quintile 1.2468*** 0.1539 0.2165 0.0835 0.4529 -0.5776** -0.6765** -0.0339 0.1988
EDI income 3rd quintile 1.1523*** 0.1863 0.7270*** -0.0288 0.3903 -0.1376 -0.3096 -0.2154 -0.1191
EDI income 4th quintile 0.9034*** -0.2348 0.1402 -0.1626 0.0277 -0.5212* -0.9035*** -0.0021 0.4259
(',LQFRPHVWTXLQWLOH¨/R6         
(',LQFRPHQGTXLQWLOH¨/R6         
(',LQFRPHUGTXLQWLOH¨/R6         
(',LQFRPHWKTXLQWLOH¨/R6         
Constant 0.5213** 0.3131** -0.3932** 0.2788 -1.1460*** -0.2439 0.7439*** -0.3610 -0.6208*
Patients 30749 34353 38429 37692 38308 37763 37228 33861 32647
Chi^2 p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R^2 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.13
Notes. Sample: CABG and PCI patients. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past
utilization in the previous year, hospital fixed effects (in Eq.(4) and (5) only). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table G3. Full estimates of Roy Model in Table 8 (excluding hospital sites fixed effects). Income inequalities in waiting times on CABG and PCI samples, after accounting
for selection of revascularisation procedure.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Panel A - Patients choosing CABG  Equation (4)
EDI income 1st quintile (most deprived) 0.3605*** 0.2238*** 0.1614*** 0.1319*** 0.1544*** 0.1260*** 0.0695*** 0.0783*** 0.0927***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.2557*** 0.1711*** 0.1028*** 0.1107*** 0.1425*** 0.1623*** 0.0708*** 0.0809*** 0.0925***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.1868*** 0.0894*** 0.1423*** 0.0959*** 0.0878*** 0.0724*** 0.0481* 0.0267 0.0679**
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0450 0.0685** 0.0602** 0.0578** 0.0336 0.0947*** 0.0225 0.0080 0.0300
Patient age 0.0041 -0.0020 0.0014 -0.0007 0.0009 0.0040 0.0032 -0.0014 0.0067**
age range 0-39 years -0.1175 -0.1880 0.0379 0.0296 0.1356 -0.0293 -0.1390 -0.1620 0.0222
age range 40-49 years -0.1383 -0.0089 0.1460** -0.1085 -0.0394 0.0071 -0.0225 -0.0636 0.0849
age range 50-59 years -0.0655 0.0160 0.0340 -0.0243 0.0077 -0.0141 -0.0204 -0.0555 0.0363
age range 70-79 years 0.0392 -0.0382 -0.0374 0.0457 -0.0027 -0.0010 -0.0089 0.0219 -0.0055
age range over 80 years -0.2443** 0.0540 0.0691 0.1356 0.1592* -0.0246 -0.0897 0.0519 -0.0369
Female patient -0.0470 0.2396*** 0.2003*** 0.0798 0.1274* 0.0385 -0.0048 0.0918 0.0223
Number of Comorbidities 0.0402* -0.0330 -0.0350* 0.0040 -0.0287 0.0153 0.0456* -0.0049 -0.0106
Past Year Emergency Admissions -0.3317*** -0.1760*** -0.1584*** -0.1233*** -0.0795*** -0.1183*** -0.1542*** -0.0571** -0.0619**
Congestive Heart Failure 0.2622** -0.3133** -0.1999** -0.1132 -0.0627 0.0255 0.0400 -0.0085 0.0047
Peripheral Vascular Disease 0.1157** -0.0566 -0.0223 0.0208 0.0297 0.0183 0.0118 0.0287 -0.0175
Cerebrovascular Disease 0.1314 -0.1396 -0.1803* 0.0570 -0.0457 -0.0310 -0.0754 -0.0383 0.0025
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) 0.0319 0.1578*** 0.1172*** 0.0572* 0.0495 -0.0197 0.0172 -0.0114 0.0553*
Rheumatoid Disease -0.1438 -0.0723 0.0337 -0.0684 -0.0643 0.0114 -0.0199 -0.0017 0.0346
Peptic Ulcer Disease -0.0701 0.0615 0.0074 0.0011 -0.0928 -0.1765 0.0120 -0.1600 -0.2659*
Mild Liver Disease -0.0901 0.0450 -0.1702 0.1877 0.4365*** -0.1830 0.0515 0.2816** 0.1551
Diabetes 0.0714** 0.0644** 0.0758*** 0.0322 0.0329* 0.0262 0.0199 0.0426* 0.0695***
Diabetes + Complications 0.0167 0.0195 0.1485 0.0798 0.2272*** 0.0329 0.0705 0.1671** 0.0756
Renal Disease 0.1017 0.1187* 0.0534 0.0868 0.0459 0.0781 0.0588 0.1023** 0.0291
Cancer -0.2728** -0.1908 -0.1763 -0.4280*** -0.1193 -0.4230*** -0.4257*** 0.1096 -0.3735***
Jan 0.1689*** 0.0814* 0.1217*** 0.2626*** 0.1461*** 0.1662*** 0.1621*** 0.1289*** 0.1933***
Feb 0.0438 0.1891*** 0.1061** 0.1987*** 0.0951** 0.1177*** 0.0740* 0.0844* 0.2846***
Mar 0.0640 0.1113** 0.0271 0.1936*** 0.0219 0.0606 0.0096 0.0432 0.1066**
April 0.2830*** -0.1214** 0.1006** 0.1361*** 0.0887** 0.0671 0.1383*** 0.1264*** 0.0844
May 0.2199*** -0.0741 0.0348 0.0869* 0.1446*** 0.1075** 0.0802* 0.1149** 0.0424
June 0.3488*** -0.0313 -0.0318 0.1007** 0.0988** 0.1292*** 0.1136*** 0.0981** 0.0563
July 0.2906*** -0.0521 0.0794* 0.0429 0.0644 0.0728* 0.1296*** 0.0664 -0.0385
Aug 0.2546*** -0.0690 0.0355 -0.0039 0.0832** 0.0669* 0.1992*** 0.0266 -0.0311
Sept 0.3280*** -0.1379*** 0.0652 0.0872** 0.0971** 0.0752* 0.1818*** 0.0587 0.0681
Oct 0.2415*** -0.0355 0.0496 0.0684 0.0431 0.1141*** 0.0763* -0.0397 0.0371
IMR1 - CABG -0.5930** 0.7736** 0.5971** 0.1162 0.3761 -0.0025 -0.2828 0.1087 0.1413
Constant 3.9205*** 4.7000*** 4.2609*** 3.8637*** 4.2500*** 3.9414*** 3.0829*** 3.2087*** 3.3728***
Hospital sites Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Panel B - Patients choosing PCI  Equation (5)
EDI income 1st quintile (most deprived) 0.5063*** 0.3105*** 0.2323*** 0.1661*** 0.1688*** 0.1670*** 0.1093*** 0.1189*** 0.1364***
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.3974*** 0.2556*** 0.1977*** 0.1622*** 0.1638*** 0.1193*** 0.0988*** 0.1215*** 0.1214***
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.2819*** 0.1568*** 0.1083*** 0.1189*** 0.1171*** 0.0903*** 0.0985*** 0.0898*** 0.0906***
EDI income 4th quintile 0.1365*** 0.0998*** 0.0469** 0.0406** 0.0667*** 0.0672*** 0.0486*** 0.0547*** 0.0541***
Patient age 0.0039 0.0012 0.0022 0.0023 0.0039** 0.0039** 0.0045** 0.0031 -0.0003
age range 0-39 years -0.2899** -0.1326 -0.0907 -0.0282 0.0030 -0.0414 0.0325 -0.0689 -0.0783
age range 40-49 years -0.1659** -0.0185 -0.0942* -0.0602 0.0331 -0.0027 -0.0036 -0.0392 -0.0973**
age range 50-59 years -0.1166*** -0.0117 -0.0582** -0.0180 0.0012 0.0080 -0.0062 -0.0416* -0.0399*
age range 70-79 years 0.0138 -0.0415 -0.0162 0.0205 -0.0068 -0.0219 -0.0100 0.0226 0.0349
age range over 80 years -0.2598** -0.0339 -0.0841 -0.0213 -0.0519 -0.0373 -0.1009** -0.1010** -0.0168
Female patient -0.0350 0.1720** 0.0335 0.0269 0.0473 0.0731** 0.0004 -0.0522* -0.0421**
Number of Comorbidities 0.0822*** -0.0105 0.0294 0.0322** 0.0189 0.0094 0.0356*** 0.0633*** 0.0641***
Past Year Emergency Admissions -0.2618*** -0.1470*** -0.1390*** -0.0967*** -0.0840*** -0.0521*** -0.0555*** -0.0554*** -0.0574***
Congestive Heart Failure 0.4385* -0.3581* 0.0974 0.0612 -0.0334 -0.0677 -0.0443 0.0181 0.0148
Peripheral Vascular Disease 0.1071 -0.0958* 0.0107 0.0344 -0.0377 0.0284 -0.0104 0.0216 -0.0057
Cerebrovascular Disease 0.1338 -0.2785* 0.0446 0.0232 -0.0204 -0.0668 -0.0104 0.1489* -0.0049
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) -0.0242 0.0366 0.0067 -0.0227 0.0268 -0.0095 -0.0153 -0.0385* -0.0092
Rheumatoid Disease -0.2182* 0.1538 -0.0084 -0.0459 0.0052 0.0303 -0.0008 0.0436 -0.1250***
Peptic Ulcer Disease 0.2453 0.0024 0.1484 0.1976* -0.3109** -0.0050 0.1627 0.0040 0.1584
Mild Liver Disease -0.0437 -0.5138 -0.0825 -0.3445 0.1868* -0.3831** 0.0867 -0.0785 0.0072
Diabetes 0.0674** 0.0169 0.0291* 0.0011 0.0126 0.0312** -0.0019 0.0062 0.0035
Diabetes + Complications 0.0173 0.1285 -0.2658** -0.0360 -0.0088 0.0586 0.0699 -0.1397* -0.0521
Renal Disease -0.0679 0.0894 -0.1970*** -0.0036 -0.0303 0.0553 -0.0723** 0.0088 -0.0732**
Cancer -0.5820*** -0.6193*** -0.6811*** -0.4789*** -0.2419*** -0.2565*** -0.3410*** -0.3030*** -0.3702***
Jan 0.1499*** 0.2542*** 0.1778*** 0.1635*** 0.1770*** 0.2005*** 0.1864*** 0.2591*** 0.2553***
Feb 0.1046** 0.2199*** 0.1316*** 0.1590*** 0.0894*** 0.1016*** 0.1120*** 0.1523*** 0.1230***
Mar 0.1160** 0.1639*** 0.1194*** 0.1004*** -0.0035 0.0687** 0.0689*** 0.1099*** 0.1309***
April -0.0028 -0.1379** 0.0459 0.2050*** 0.0950*** 0.3907*** 0.0876*** 0.1347*** 0.1734***
May -0.0046 0.0247 0.0337 0.1293*** 0.1336*** 0.3507*** 0.0144 0.1187*** 0.1298***
June 0.0434 0.0627 0.1272*** 0.1665*** 0.0866*** 0.3923*** 0.0846*** 0.1654*** 0.1784***
July 0.0845* -0.0083 0.0791** 0.1020*** 0.0386 0.2831*** 0.0513** 0.0465* 0.0761***
Aug 0.1131** 0.0233 0.1471*** 0.0976*** 0.0784*** 0.2844*** 0.0425 0.0901*** 0.0974***
Sept 0.0919* 0.0454 0.1234*** 0.1286*** 0.0863*** 0.2493*** 0.1098*** 0.1433*** 0.1607***
Oct 0.0945** 0.0879** 0.0957*** 0.0742*** 0.0482* 0.1908*** -0.0365 0.0137 0.0895***
Nov 0.0140 0.0888** 0.0319 0.0834*** 0.0311 0.1589*** 0.0264 0.0700*** 0.1206***
IMR0 - PCI -0.7795* 0.5696 -0.1959 -0.1536 0.0035 0.1766 -0.2522 -0.5481*** -0.4976***
Constant 4.2005*** 3.5923*** 4.1968*** 3.6976*** 3.5055*** 3.0236*** 3.5466*** 3.4960*** 3.4379***
Hospital sites Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Panel C - 1st Stage Probit for Choice of procedure: CABG vs PCI  Equation (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Differential distance of first 3 hospitals by procedure -0.0016*** 0.0001 -0.0013*** -0.0008** -0.0004 0.0009*** -0.0003 -0.0008** -0.0020***
EDI income 1st quintile (most deprived) 0.1810*** 0.0191 0.0173 0.0338 0.0295 -0.0008 -0.0030 -0.0087 -0.0053
EDI income 2nd quintile 0.1254*** 0.0314 -0.0024 0.0543** 0.0077 0.0148 0.0281 0.0139 0.0104
EDI income 3rd quintile 0.0909*** 0.0016 -0.0176 0.0314 -0.0171 0.0252 -0.0014 0.0039 -0.0300
EDI income 4th quintile 0.0636*** -0.0210 -0.0177 0.0612*** 0.0017 -0.0050 -0.0284 0.0013 0.0282
Patient age 0.0096*** 0.0091*** 0.0102*** 0.0094*** 0.0094*** 0.0005 0.0085*** 0.0029 -0.0023
age range 0-39 years -0.3061*** -0.3015*** -0.2823** -0.0918 -0.2956** -0.1060 -0.0210 -0.1426 -0.2199*
age range 40-49 years -0.1636*** -0.1351** -0.1334** -0.1088* -0.0825 -0.2347*** -0.0359 -0.1776*** -0.2276***
age range 50-59 years -0.0861*** -0.0658** -0.0578** -0.0711** -0.0701** -0.1090*** -0.0546* -0.1055*** -0.0717**
age range 70-79 years 0.0099 0.0389 -0.0149 0.0015 0.0198 0.0730** -0.0302 0.0368 0.0237
age range over 80 years -0.4070*** -0.3829*** -0.4832*** -0.4627*** -0.3756*** -0.2170*** -0.4207*** -0.3631*** -0.2711***
Female patient -0.3128*** -0.3407*** -0.3598*** -0.3203*** -0.3436*** -0.2886*** -0.3388*** -0.3389*** -0.3068***
Number of Comorbidities 0.1192*** 0.1102*** 0.1179*** 0.1146*** 0.1364*** 0.1424*** 0.1585*** 0.1627*** 0.1825***
Past Year Emergency Admissions -0.1505*** -0.1284*** -0.1145*** -0.1025*** -0.1258*** -0.1301*** -0.1373*** -0.1199*** -0.1901***
Congestive Heart Failure 0.7357*** 0.6994*** 0.6561*** 0.6886*** 0.3365*** 0.2807*** 0.2487*** -0.0469 -0.0245
Peripheral Vascular Disease 0.1660*** 0.1429*** 0.0671** 0.0399 0.0312 -0.0751** -0.0165 0.0560* -0.0043
Cerebrovascular Disease 0.6004*** 0.5050*** 0.6662*** 0.6712*** 0.3980*** 0.4536*** 0.4553*** 0.3974*** 0.2798***
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) -0.0492 -0.1334*** -0.0756*** -0.0586** -0.0882*** -0.0653** -0.1185*** -0.1476*** -0.1198***
Rheumatoid Disease -0.0460 -0.0771 -0.1470* -0.0314 -0.2366*** -0.0634 -0.0288 -0.0177 -0.1789***
Peptic Ulcer Disease 0.1149 0.0838 0.1864 0.3119** 0.1442 0.2019 0.0638 0.0650 0.3818***
Mild Liver Disease -0.2714 0.2168 -0.2847 -0.2433 -0.2328 -0.1994 -0.1881 -0.0861 -0.3578**
Diabetes 0.0296 0.0619*** -0.0206 -0.0141 0.0177 -0.0420** -0.0940*** -0.1141*** -0.1046***
Diabetes + Complications -0.1639 0.0134 -0.1407 -0.0527 0.1056 -0.0912 -0.0885 -0.1153 -0.1557**
Renal Disease 0.0087 -0.1425*** -0.0434 -0.1127** -0.1432*** -0.1507*** -0.1247*** -0.1004*** -0.1710***
Cancer -0.1327 -0.2029** -0.3627*** -0.1917** -0.3282*** -0.1432* -0.1341* -0.0907 -0.2581***
Jan 0.0011 0.0359 0.0870** 0.0649* 0.0191 0.0380 -0.0091 0.0801** 0.0472
Feb -0.0023 -0.0191 0.0230 -0.0249 -0.0051 -0.0182 0.0183 0.0011 0.0071
Mar -0.0244 -0.0261 0.0774** -0.0354 -0.0099 -0.0516 0.0021 -0.0347 0.0378
April 0.1100*** 0.1770*** 0.0413 -0.0352 0.0594 -0.0954** -0.0161 -0.0066 0.1301***
May 0.0501 0.1459*** 0.1645*** 0.0883** 0.0361 -0.1696*** 0.0395 0.0379 0.1868***
June 0.0601 0.0979*** 0.1020*** 0.0204 -0.0007 -0.1454*** 0.0610* 0.0794** 0.1711***
July 0.0587 0.0347 0.0441 -0.0005 0.0762** -0.1033*** 0.0492 0.0142 0.1117***
Aug 0.0606 0.0589 0.0898** -0.0001 0.0498 -0.0688* 0.1093*** 0.0851** 0.2552***
Sept 0.0842** 0.1114*** 0.0758** -0.0408 -0.0005 -0.0481 0.0842** 0.0443 0.1607***
Oct 0.0054 -0.0101 0.0972*** 0.0445 0.0378 -0.0136 0.0089 -0.0467 0.0972**
Nov 0.0098 -0.0087 -0.0069 -0.0504 0.0028 -0.0564 0.0394 -0.0301 0.1075***
Constant -0.0714** -0.1671*** -0.3132*** -0.4841*** -0.4246*** -0.2987*** -0.3746*** -0.4634*** -0.5697***
Notes. Sample: CABG and PCI patients. Controls include hospital fixed effects (in Eq.(4) and (5) only). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
